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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Of the many theological and philosophical issues on which Augustine wrote, none 
seemed to capture his imagination more than the so-called problem of evil.  Indeed, the problem 
seems to have puzzled Augustine for most of his adult life, as indicated by the number of times 
the topic appears in his writings.  In recognition of this fact, John Hick points out “from his 
earliest to his latest writings Augustine was continually turning to the problem of evil.  His 
characteristic teaching on the subject appears not only in the great works of his maturity, De 
Civitate Dei, the Confessiones, and the Enchiridion, but also in a succession of earlier books 
going back to his controversies with the Manichees.”1  Questions regarding the origin and nature 
of evil drove Augustine to inquiry into such diverse topics as the cause of human perversity, the 
nature of God, the nature of reality, freedom of the will, divine providence, and the grace of God, 
to name just a few.  In this regard, as G. R. Evans observes, “Augustine’s account of the problem 
of evil came in the end to embrace almost every area of his writing, as he perceived more and 
more of the ramifications of the subject.”2  Finding a solution was not, however, purely an 
academic exercise for Augustine.  As illustrated in the Confessiones, Augustine witnessed, 
experienced, and participated in evil firsthand, and it was these experiences that seem to have 
compelled him to search for a solution. 
The problem of evil, as will be discussed here, is the apparent incompatibility of the 
presence of any evil in the world, both natural and moral, with the existence of a creative God 
who is conceived of as: (1) omnipotent or all-powerful, (2) omniscient or all-knowing, and (3) 
omnibenevolent or all-good; in other words, a God that possesses what are commonly known as 
                                                 
1 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966), 43. 
2 G. R. Evans, “Evil,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 340-341.  
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the traditional Christian omnipredicates.  As the problem is often stated:  if God is omnipotent, 
God must have the power to remove all evil from creation; if God is omniscient, God must be 
aware of evil’s presence; and, if God is omnibenevolent, God would want to eradicate any 
vestige of evil so as not to cause harm to creation.  But evil has not been removed.  Therefore, 
the presence of evil along with the existence of a creative God who is all-powerful, all-knowing, 
and all-good are in conflict.   
There are several ways to avoid the dilemma.  A monotheist, for instance, could maintain 
that God lacks the power to remove evil, questioning God’s omnipotence; or that God is unaware 
of the evil, denying God’s omniscience; or that God does not want to remove the evil, 
challenging God’s goodness.  One could also maintain, as did the Manichees, the existence of 
two gods, one that is responsible for the good and the other responsible for evil.  But if any one 
of these scenarios is asserted, then belief in the traditional Christian God of Augustine would 
need to be abandoned.  Augustine’s challenge, then, as a Christian theologian and a philosopher, 
is to provide a rational explanation for evil, while still maintaining the traditional omnipredicates 
of God.   
Augustine’s discussion of evil can be divided into two types: natural evil, evil that affects 
physical objects, such as disease, wounds, and disfigurement; and, moral evil, evil that spiritual 
beings originate, such as pride, cruelty, and deceit.  The starting point for Augustine’s solution is 
that evil is nothing more than a privation of the good (privatio boni).  But what Augustine 
intends this to mean is often difficult to discern in the many works in which he writes on the 
topic.  Two problems complicate an analysis of Augustine’s solution.  First, Augustine uses 
different terms to characterize the privation.  While the majority of Augustine’s discussions 
focus on evil as a privation of the good (Confessiones VII.12, Enchiridion 4.12-14, De Natura 
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Boni VI, XVII), in other treatises, and indeed sometimes within the same treatise, he describes 
the privation as either: (1) a privation of substance (Enchiridion 3.11, De Civitate Dei XII.3, De 
Natura Boni XX); (2) a falling away from Being toward non-Being, non-existence or 
nothingness (De Moribus Ecclesia Catholicae 2.2.3, De Trinitate V.2); or, (3) a privation of 
“measure, number, and weight” (De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, Question 6, De Natura 
Boni, XXIII).  The second problem complicating an analysis is that Augustine wrote many of his 
treatises, especially the anti-Manichaean treatises, not to present his philosophical viewpoints in 
a well-ordered, organized, and systematic manner, but rather, to address a specific heresy that he 
was attempting to combat or refute.  The result is that his discussions on the topic often appear 
disconnected and discontinuous.  Because of this, Augustine is regarded as a non-systematic 
thinker in much of the secondary literature.  
Despite these apparent problems, I will argue that a single coherent account of 
Augustine’s solution to both natural and moral evil can be revealed.  As such, I will demonstrate 
that the solutions that Augustine provides for both natural and moral evil rely on a similar 
metaphysical foundation that can be discovered through a careful examination of the many texts 
in which he discusses the topic.  In addition, I will argue, contrary to the opinion of several 
commentators, that while Augustine may not have been a systematic writer, he was indeed a 
systematic thinker, at least in regards to the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to 
the problem of evil.  
Three claims are generally made by commentators when asserting that Augustine is not a 
systematic thinker.  First, writers such as Albert C. Outler, Eugene TeSelle and N. Joseph 
Torchia point out that, rather than attempting to develop an organized system of thought drawn 
out of a few fundamental principles or following a rigorously formulated method, Augustine’s 
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theological and philosophical viewpoints are instead worked out within the context of dealing 
with real problems that he encountered.3  As already pointed out, such is often the case with the 
problem of evil, as many of the works in which Augustine discusses evil were written to refute 
Manichean doctrines.  Second, Augustine’s philosophical and theological views are 
characterized by TeSelle and Torchia as being a continually evolving inquiry, rather than a well 
worked out systematic whole.4  As such, according to these writers, each stage of Augustine’s 
thought must be examined, “in and for itself in the attempt to discover its exact pattern and 
framework.”5  There is continuity and coherence in Augustine’s thought, according to TeSelle, 
but it is a continuity and a coherence that is constantly changing depending on the circumstances 
of the issue at hand.6  In this regard, William J. Bouwsma points out, Augustine’s writings 
“evolved out of rich and varied experiences, the changing circumstances of his external life, and 
above all his inner development.”7  Augustine’s thought, therefore, according to Bouwsma, can 
“be apprehended fully only as a set of tendencies rather than a system; its coherence is 
biographical, rather than structural.”8  Finally, commentators such as Adolph Harnack argue that 
Augustine’s writings contain not only inconsistencies in details, but indeed, completely opposite 
views and conflicting lines of thought.  For example, according to Harnack, in his conflict with 
Manichaeism and Donatism, Augustine formulated a doctrine of freedom, the Church, and the 
means of grace “which has little in common with his experience of sin and grace, and simply 
conflicts with the theological development of that experience—the doctrine of predestinating 
                                                 
3 Albert C. Outler, “Introduction,” in Augustine: Confessions and Enchiridion, trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1955), 16; Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1970), 344; N. Joseph Torchia, Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic 
and Beyond (New York: Peter Lang, 1999), ix. 
4 TeSelle, 20; Torchia, ix. 
5 TeSelle, 20.  
6 TeSelle, 20. 
7 William J. Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," in A 
Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 23. 
8 Bouwsma, 23. 
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grace.”9  In short, according to Harnack, “as a Christologian . . . Augustine bequeathed more 
gaps than positive material to posterity.”10 
In response to these criticisms, I concede that Augustine’s reasoning on several 
theological issues is indeed unclear, confusing, and, at times, even fallacious.  Augustine 
admitted so himself in regard to several of his works in his Retractiones, a work written late in 
Augustine’s life in which he systematically reviewed his entire literary output.11  For instance, 
writing about De Inmortalitate Animae in the Retractiones, Augustine states, “because of the 
intricacy and brevity of its reasoning, it is so obscure that even my attention flags as I read it and 
I, myself, can scarcely understand it.”12  Augustine found De Mendacio Liber Unus to be equally 
confusing, describing it in the Retractiones as “vague, complicated, and entirely irksome.”13 
I concede also that the Retractiones demonstrate rather unequivocally, as pointed out by 
TeSelle and Torchia, that Augustine’s thought was constantly evolving throughout his life.  Even 
a cursory reading of the Retractiones will demonstrate that in this work Augustine clarified, 
revised, and even retracted statements and assertions he had made previously in his writings.  
Commenting on such revisions, Allen D. Fitzgerald points out, “Augustine’s works were not for 
him accomplishments of the past, but living testimonies to faith that were just as subject to 
change and improvement as he was.”14   
In addition, I concede that Augustine’s overall approach to his philosophical and 
theological thinking is not systematic in the sense that: (1) he did not follow a strict formalized 
method; and, (2) some of the positions he formulated early in his life are in conflict with those 
                                                 
9 Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, vol. 5, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York: Russell and Russell, 1958), 101. 
10 Harnack, 102.  
11 Mary Inez Bogan, “Introduction,” in Saint Augustine: The Retractions (Retractiones), trans. Mary Inez Bogan 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 1968), xiii. 
12 Retractiones, 20. 
13 Retractiones, 117.  
14 Allan D. Fitzgerald, “Retractiones,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Group, 1999), 723. 
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written later on.  However, in regard to the problem of evil, the only topic that I wish to address 
in this thesis, it is my supposition that Augustine did indeed develop a highly systematic 
metaphysical theory of the nature of reality, which remains consistent throughout the treatises in 
which he writes on the subject.  Thus, while Augustine could never be characterized as a 
systematic writer, his discussions on the problem of evil, I shall argue, do indeed reveal that he 
was a systematic thinker.   
My essay will be arranged in the following manner.  In Chapter Two, I present an 
historical account of the early Christian and Manichaean influences on Augustine’s developing 
viewpoints, which eventually came to influence his solution to the problem of evil.  As 
Augustine’s solution is in many ways a reaction to the Manichaean doctrines to which he was 
exposed during his nine-year association with the sect, it is necessary to have an understanding 
of these doctrines and how they influenced his philosophical and theological outlook.  In Chapter 
Three, I continue the historical theme and discuss one of the other major influences on 
Augustine’s solution, the philosophy of the Neoplatonists, concentrating on the philosophy of 
Plotinus.  In Chapter Four, I examine Augustine’s privative treatment of natural evil.  Here I 
show that a coherent metaphysical account can be derived from the various ways in which he 
characterizes evil.  In Chapter Five, I demonstrate how Augustine uses his metaphysical solution 
for natural evil as a starting point for his solution to the problem of moral evil, in the sense that 
when human beings sin they fall away from God not just morally, but ontologically as well.  
Based on the findings of my investigation I will demonstrate in Chapter Six, the Conclusion, that 
Augustine did, in point of fact, develop a coherent metaphysical system which serves as the basis 
for his philosophically influenced solution to the problem of evil. 
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CHAPTER TWO: EARLY CHRISTIAN AND MANICHAEAN INFLUENCES 
 
Augustine’s search for a solution to the problem of evil was, in many ways, intimately 
linked to his lifelong pursuit of truth and wisdom and his interest in using reason to provide 
answers to the problems that troubled him.  This search for wisdom aided by reason led 
Augustine through at least three religious and philosophical systems relevant to this study: 
Christianity, Manichaeism, and Neoplatonism, all of which contributed to how he viewed evil 
and accounted for its presence in the world.15  It is the first two of these systems, along with 
Augustine’s introduction to philosophy through Cicero’s Hortensius, that will be examined in 
this chapter.   
Early Christian Influences 
One of the earliest influences on Augustine’s intellectual development was that of the 
Christianity to which he was exposed during his youth.  Though many of the details of 
Augustine’s religious upbringing remain unknown, it is possible to establish a few basic facts 
from the description he provides in the Confessiones.  For example, Augustine reports in the 
Confessiones that his father Patricius was a pagan and that his mother Monica was a Christian.16  
He also tells us that as a boy his mother initiated him into the catechumenate of the Catholic 
Church and that as a catechumen he “was blessed regularly from birth with the sign of the Cross 
and was seasoned with God’s salt,”17 rites performed, according to some scholars, to help 
                                                 
15 This is not to suggest that these are the only influences on Augustine’s thought.  Augustine’s own account in the 
Confessiones reveals that he was influenced by a variety of sources.  Due to space limitations, however, I will limit 
my discussion to the influence that Christianity, Manichaeanism, and Neoplatonism had on his solution to the 
problem of evil.  
16 Augustine, Confessiones, I.11, in Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin, 1961), 
32. Hereafter referenced with the abbreviation Conf.  
17 Conf. I.11, 32. 
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preserve the soul from the corruption of sin18 and to ward off attacks from demonic forces.19  In 
addition, Augustine tells us that his mother postponed his baptism during childhood, even after 
he fell seriously ill for fear that he was not ready at such a young age to put an end to his sinful 
ways.20  Furthermore, Augustine reports that from an early age he believed in the God of 
Christianity and in Jesus as Christ21 and that he prayed to God on a regular basis.22  In fact, 
according to Augustine, everyone in his family believed in the God of Christianity and in Christ, 
except for his father, who remained a pagan until he converted shortly before his death.23  
Beyond these few details, however, we know very little about Augustine’s early involvement in 
Christianity or the Church.  We also know very little about the religious education he received, 
except that it more than likely came almost entirely from his mother.24 
Although Augustine provides us with little information regarding his religious 
upbringing, it would probably be a mistake to conclude that his early exposure to Christianity left 
no indelible mark on his religious and intellectual development.  As John J. O’Meara points out, 
“from these early years with Monica” the young Augustine got at least “certain childish notions 
of God’s nature and a child’s approach to Scripture.”25  Furthermore, O’Meara tell us, “in 
adolescence and early manhood [Augustine] always preserved a great reverence for the name of 
Christ, and a strong link between him and Christ was always in the background in the person of 
his mother.”26  As we shall see, although Augustine did not fully convert until the age of 32, his 
                                                 
18 John M. Quinn, A Companion to the Confessions of St. Augustine (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 41. 
19 William Harmless, Augustine and the Catechumenate (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 80.  
20Conf. I.11, 32.  According to Quinn (41), this was a fairly normal custom for Christians during the time period as 
sins committed after baptism were considered more malicious in the “eyes of God.”   
21 Conf. I.11, 32. 
22 Conf. I.10, 31. 
23 Conf. I.11, 32; IX.9, 10.  
24 Conf. I.11, 32; II.3, 38. 
25 John J. O’Meara, The Young Augustine: An Introduction to the Confessions of St. Augustine (London: Longman, 
1980), 38.  
26 O’Meara, 38. 
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early experiences with Christianity established a deep and abiding connection, even as he 
investigated other religious and philosophical systems.  
Introduction to Philosophy 
In his nineteenth year, Augustine read the Hortensius, a short exhortation to the study of 
philosophy written by Cicero.27  The work seemingly had a profound effect on him.  As he tells 
us in the Confessiones, the work altered his outlook on life and filled his heart with the desire for 
wisdom and truth.28  Elsewhere he tells us that the Hortensius turned him away from the “desire 
of riches”29 and toward the “study of philosophy.”30  The one fault Augustine found with the 
work was that it made no mention of Christ.31  So deep was Augustine’s attachment to 
Christianity during this time period, at least if we are to believe his account in the Confessiones, 
that he tells us that “nothing could captivate [him], however learned, however neatly expressed, 
however true it might be, unless [Christ’s] name were in it.”32  Such a reaction, according to 
Peter Brown, would have been quite understandable.  Having been raised in a Christian 
household, a pagan wisdom without the name of Christ would have been unimaginable for the 
young Augustine as Christianity would have been presented to him from childhood as a form of 
“True Wisdom.”33   
Burning with this desire for wisdom imbued with the name of Christ, Augustine reports 
that he turned next to the Bible to “examine the holy Scriptures.”34  What he found there, 
however, disappointed him as the text “seemed quite unworthy of comparison with the stately 
                                                 
27 Conf. III.4, 58. 
28 Conf. III.4, 58. 
29 Augustine, Solioquia 1.10.17, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, trans. John H. S. Burleigh, vol. VI of The Library of 
Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 33. 
30 Conf. VIII.7, 169. 
31 Conf. III.4, 59. 
32 Conf. III.4, 59.  Augustine reiterates this point in Conf. V.6, 97, where he tells us, “there is no other teacher of the 
truth besides yourself, no matter how or where it comes to light.” 
33 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 29, 31. 
34 Conf. III.5, 60. 
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prose of Cicero.”35  Two factors may have prompted such a reaction.  First, as Brown observes, 
stylistically the Old Latin Bible available to Augustine at this time was filled with slang and 
jargon which would have been abhorrent to someone raised on the eloquence of Cicero.36  In this 
regard, it would not have been a book “to impress a man whose mind was full of elegant 
Ciceronian diction and Virgilian turns of phrase.”37  Second, as noted by Brown and Henry 
Chadwick, Augustine would have been put off by the immoral actions of the patriarchs in the 
Old Testament and contradictory passages he would have found in the New Testament, such as 
the long, conflicting genealogies of Jesus,38 as these passages would not have contained the 
wisdom and truth for which he was searching.  
Augustine’s disappointment with the Scriptures, however, may have gone much deeper 
than just an aversion to their crude literary style and textual contradictions.  As N. Joseph 
Torchia points out, Augustine’s negative reaction was probably also “reinforced by the extreme 
conservatism and anti-intellectualism of the North African Christianity with which Augustine 
was familiar.”39  Such a view is supported by Roland J. Teske, who states that Augustine’s  
. . . references to the terror of superstition and the yoke of authority that he found in the 
Catholica would seem to indicate that he not merely could not find within the Church 
solutions to his intellectual problems, but met with a conservative anti-intellectualism that 
refused to deal with them.40 
 
Brown concurs with Teske’s assessment, noting that the North African Church was exceptionally 
narrow minded, oppressive, and exceedingly sensitive to any challenge to its authority.41  
 
                                                 
35 Conf. III.5, 60. 
36 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 31.  
37 Henry Chadwick, Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10-11. 
38 Brown, 31; Chadwick, 10-11. 
39 Torchia, Creatio Ex Nihilo, 97-98. 
40 Teske, “Introduction,” in Saint Augustine on Genesis: Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and on the 
Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, trans. Roland J. Teske, vol. 84 of The Fathers of the Church 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 9.  
41 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 31-32. 
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Manichaean Influences 
Augustine’s failure to find the truth in the Catholic Scriptures, and quite possibly his 
reaction to the narrow-mindedness and authority of the North African Church, seemingly led him 
to become an auditor (literally, a “hearer,” but more specifically, a lay-person) in the Manichees, 
an “eclectic faith”42 that merged a variety of belief systems and worldviews, including 
Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, astrology, and science, among others.43  Based on the 
revelations and teachings of the self-proclaimed prophet Mani (216-277 CE), the Manichees 
preached a form of radical dualism that seemed to have appealed to Augustine for a number of 
reasons.  First, the Manichees claimed to know the truth.  As Augustine tells it, “‘Truth, and truth 
alone’ was the motto which they repeated . . . again and again.”44  Because Augustine also 
desired to know the truth—indeed, as he tells us “the very marrow of [his] soul yearned for 
it”45—he became more deeply involved with the group and the promise of truth that they 
preached.  Second, the Manichees claimed to provide a truer and purified version of Christianity 
by rejecting the Old Testament, which they saw as “crude and repulsive.”46  In rejecting the Old 
Testament, the Manichees drew attention to passages which they considered inconsistent or 
contradictory, either with each other or with statements in the New Testament.47  In this regard 
the Manichees pointed out that it was credulous to believe that the Scriptures contained the 
Wisdom of God when one part of the Bible contradicted another.48  Such a viewpoint would 
have held some attraction for Augustine, because, as already stated, he found the Scriptures too 
                                                 
42 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 44. 
43 A. V. Williams Jackson, Researches in Manichaeism, With Special Reference to the Turfan Fragments (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 3-20; Torchia, Creatio Ex Nihilo, 65-67.  
44 Conf. III.6, 60. 
45 Conf. III.6, 60. 
46 T. Kermit Scott, Augustine: His Thought in Context (New York: Paulist Press, 1995), 75.  
47 L. H. Hackstaff, “Introduction,” in Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. 
Hackstaff with an introduction by L.H. Hackstaff (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1964), xxii.  
48 Colin Starnes, Augustine’s Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of Confessions I-IX (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1990), 68.  
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unsophisticated in style for his literary tastes.49  In addition, the Manichees espoused a strict 
rationalism which they contrasted with the naive faith demanded of Catholic believers.50  As 
such, they claimed that reason alone could provide access to an understanding of the universe 
and ultimately to truth, a feature that would have “appealed strongly to the philosophical 
disposition of the young Augustine.”51  Moreover, the Manichaean emphasis on Christ must have 
held a special attraction for Augustine, as the absence of the mention of Christ in the Hortensius 
was the one fault that he found with the work.  The Manichees, thus, as Carol Harrison points 
out, “enabled Augustine to reconcile himself, or so it seemed, to a more coherent, rationally 
defensible, superior form of Christianity” than that taught to him by his mother.52  But perhaps 
the primary reason why Manichaeism appealed to Augustine at this point in his life was that it 
provided a rational answer to the question he puts forth in his dialogue De Libero Arbitrio: 
“What is the source of our evildoing?”53   
The Manichees and Evil 
The Manichaean solution to the problem of evil is founded on a radical dualism deeply 
rooted in the cosmogony or creation myth of the sect.54  Simply stated, the Manichees 
maintained the existence of two eternal, but opposed, corporeal deities, one good and the other 
evil.  Light was identified with the God of goodness, the Prince of Light, while darkness was 
identified with the Devil, the Prince of Darkness.  The realms of the two gods were separate, 
                                                 
49 Mary T. Clark, Augustine (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 2. See also: Donald X. Burt, 
Augustine’s World: An Introduction to His Speculative Philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 
15.   
50 Scott, Augustine, 74. 
51 Hackstaff, “Introduction,” On Free Choice of the Will, xxii. 
52 Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 24.  
53 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio) I.1.1, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1993), 3.  As Augustine puts it, the answer to this question drove him “into the company of 
heretics,” meaning, the Manichees.   
54 My description of the Manichaean cosmogony is based on a description provided by Starnes, Augustine’s 
Confessions, 64.  See also O’Meara, The Young Augustine, 70-75. 
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except where they touched one another along a common border.  While attempting to expand his 
empire, the Prince of Darkness gained command of a small corner of the Kingdom of Light, 
fusing the once separated Kingdoms.  Within this captured realm, the Prince of Darkness took 
particles of Light captive and trapped them in its matter.  According to the myth, the natural 
universe we experience was created by the merging of the two realms of light and dark, good and 
evil.  In this way, all of nature, including human beings, is composed of the mixture of tiny 
particles of these two contraries in varying degrees.  The natural universe is thus a battleground 
of the two contrary forces in which evil tries to prevail over the good, and the good attempts to 
overcome the evil.   
As a part of the physical universe, human beings are also a part of the battleground 
between good and evil, driven sometimes by the one side and sometimes by the other.  Sin is 
understood to originate in the evil principle within human beings, while goodness is understood 
to originate in the good principle.55  Because the Prince of Darkness is responsible for the 
creation of the natural universe, the evil forces within human beings are identified with the body 
and matter, while the good is identified with the spirit, the Prince of Light.  The goal of life, 
according to the Manichees, is to identify oneself with the forces of good, the spirit, and to avoid 
any activities that would strengthen the forces of evil, matter.   
The Manichaean solution to the problem of evil, then, essentially absolves human beings 
from the moral evil they perform by attributing such evil to the work of a dark force in the 
universe of which humans have no control.  Such a view must have provided both comfort and 
relief to the young Augustine, who recognized that while he committed evil, he seemingly could 
not control himself from perpetrating it.  Indeed, as Augustine tells us,  
                                                 
55 Hackstaff, “Introduction,” On Free Choice of the Will, xxii.  
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It flattered my pride to think that I incurred no guilt and, when I did wrong, not to confess 
it so that you might bring healing to a soul that had sinned against you.  I preferred to 
excuse myself and blame this unknown thing which was in me but was not part of me.56   
 
This was why, according to Augustine, he still associated with the elect of the Manichees, even 
after he had, for the most part, disassociated himself from most of their teachings.57  
Despite the comfort which such an explanation may have afforded, the Manichaean 
solution may also have been attractive to Augustine for a number of other reasons as well.  For 
one, the Manichaean solution removed one of the main challenges posed to Christianity: How 
could a perfectly good and benevolent God of creation not in some way be ultimately responsible 
for the evil that exists in the world?  Such a dilemma may be expressed by the following 
statements: 
1. God is omnipotent (all-powerful).  
2. God is the highest good (the most benevolent). 
3. Everything that exists (other than God) comes from God.  
4. Only good things come from the highest good (God).  
5. Evil exists.  
 
To Augustine the young rhetorician, the last statement would most certainly have appeared 
inconsistent and contradictory with the first four.  Surely, if God is the creator of all that exists, 
then God must be the creator of evil as well.  But how could an all-good God be the author of 
evil?  And if God is all powerful, then certainly God should be able to create a world in which 
evil does not exist, or at least one in which it is eradicated.  The inconsistency between the 
statements would appear insurmountable.  
The dilemma has been described by Gareth B. Matthews as the “Consistency Problem of 
Evil.”58  To avoid the inconsistency, any one of the first four statements could be denied.  In fact, 
the Consistency Problem arises, according to Matthews, only when “omni” attributes are 
                                                 
56 Conf. V.10, 103. 
57 Conf. V.10, 104.  
58 Gareth B. Matthews, Augustine (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 106.  
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assigned to God, in particular, the attributes of being all-powerful and all-good.59  The 
Manichean system attempts to overcome the Consistency Problem by asserting the existence of 
two gods, one responsible for all that is good and the other responsible for all that is evil.  
Arranging their cosmogony in this way the Manichees were able to absolve the good god—the 
god identified with the Christian god—of all responsibility for both creating and allowing evil’s 
presence in the world.   
In addition to offering an explanation for the existence of evil, Manichaeanism may also 
have been attractive to Augustine because it offered a solution to one other theological problem 
which troubled him: his inability to conceive of God and evil as anything other than material 
substances.  As already pointed out, the Manichaean cosmogony myth conceived of both the 
good and evil gods as corporeal substances.  Unlike the god of Christianity, however, the good 
and evil gods of Manichaeanism were not conceived of as possessing human forms.  One of the 
Manichaean criticisms of the Christian faith was that the God of the Old Testament is often 
depicted anthropomorphically.60  Accepting the criticisms of the Manichees against the 
anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament, Augustine tells us that, although he thought it 
outrageous to believe that God had the shape of a human body, he could not conceive of God as 
anything other than as a bodily substance.61  Augustine's difficulties were further exasperated 
during this time by his reading of Aristotle's Ten Categories.  Based on his understanding of the 
                                                 
59 Matthews, Augustine, 106.  
60 Augustine, Contra Epistolam Manichai quam vocant Fundamenti (Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called 
Fundamental), Chap. 23  in St. Augustine: The Writings Against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists, trans. 
R. Stothert, vol. IV of A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip 
Schaff (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979), 139.  See also, Conf. III.7, 62. 
61 Conf. V.10, 104.  See also Conf. III.7.  Here Augustine characterizes his ignorance of God’s nature as such: “My 
ignorance was so great that these questions troubled me. . . . I did not know that God is a spirit, a being without bulk 
and without limbs defined in length and breadth.  For bulk is less in the part than in the whole, if it is infinite, it is 
less in any part of it which can be defined within fixed limits than it is in its infinity. It cannot, therefore, be 
everywhere entirely whole, as a spirit is and as God is. Nor had I the least notion what it is in us that gives us our 
being, or what the Scriptures mean when they say that we are made in God’s image.”  
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book, Augustine believed that all existing reality could be reduced to the ten categories that 
Aristotle proposed.62  As such, Augustine believed that the categories must hold for God as well.  
As Augustine explains it: 
[The study of the categories] made difficulties for me, because I thought that everything 
that existed could be reduced to these ten categories, and I therefore attempted to 
understand you, my God, in all your wonderful immutable simplicity, in these same 
terms, as though you too were substance, and greatness and beauty were your attributes in 
the same way that a body has attributes by which it is defined.63   
 
Augustine’s materialistic conception of reality applied to his conception of evil as well.  In Book 
V of the Confessiones, Augustine tells us that he believed that evil too must be some kind of 
“shapeless hideous mass,”64 which might be solid or rarefied like air.65  Although Augustine 
continued to search for answers to both the problem of evil and the nature of God within the 
doctrines of Christianity, he tells us that, at least during this period of his intellectual 
development, he believed “there could be no answer to the objections raised by the Manichees 
against the Scriptures.”66    
Eventually, however, Augustine began to lose interest in the Manichean doctrines and 
practices.  This seemingly occurred for a number of reasons, as pointed out by Augustine in 
several of his writings.67  First, Augustine came to doubt the scientific accuracy of the 
predictions made by the Manichaean astrologers and scientists when he compared them to the 
                                                 
62 The categories specified by Aristotle are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, 
action, and passion. See Michael V. Wedin, “Aristotle,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert 
Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 45.  
63 Conf. IV.16, 87-88.   
64 Conf. V.10, 104. 
65 Conf. V.10, 104. 
66 Conf. V.11, 105. 
67 See for example, Conf. VII.2-3, 135-136; Augustine, De moribus Manichaeorum 19.67-72, in Saint Augustine: 
The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life (De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et De Moribus Manichaeorum), 
trans. Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. Gallagher (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1966), 111-114; and, De natura boni XLII-XLVIII, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, trans. John H. S. Burleigh, vol. 
VI of The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 340-348. 
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findings of “genuine scientists.”68  Second, Augustine came to realize that many Manichees did 
not practice the asceticism and morality that the group preached.69  As Augustine tells us in De 
Moribus Manichaeorum, during the years he spent with the Manichees he did not know of a 
single member of the Elect who was not in violation of the group’s own precepts.70  Third, 
Augustine tells us in the Confessiones and De Natura Boni that he began to doubt the 
Manichaean solution to the problem of evil, which raised concerns about the power, 
corruptibility, and supposedly good nature of the all-good God.71 
Augustine’s final disillusionment, however, at least if we are to believe his account in the 
Confessiones, was the result of a disappointing encounter he had with a certain Manichean 
bishop named Faustus.  Augustine was promised by other members of the sect who were unable 
to answer his questions that Faustus would be able to do so and that he would have no difficulty 
                                                 
68 See for example, Conf. V.5, 95-96.  Writing about the inaccuracies of Manichaean science Augustine states: “But 
who asked that any Manichee should write about science as well as religion, when we can learn our duty to God 
without a knowledge of these things?  For you have told man that wisdom is fearing the Lord. Even if Manes did not 
have this true wisdom, he could still have had a very good knowledge of science; but as he knew no science and yet 
had the effrontery to try to teach it, he could not possibly have had true wisdom. For it is sheer vanity for a man to 
profess his learning, even if it is well founded, whereas it is his duty to you, O God, to confess his sins. Manes, 
departed from this duty. He wrote at great length on scientific subjects, only to be proved wrong by genuine 
scientists, thereby making perfectly clear the true nature of his insight into more abstruse matters. Because he did 
not want them to think lightly of him, he tried to convince his followers that the Holy Spirit, who comforts and 
enriches your faithful servants, was present in him personally and with full powers. Therefore, when he was shown 
to be wrong in what he said about the sky and the stars and the movements of the sun and the moon, it was obvious 
that he was guilty of sacrilegious presumption, because, although these matters are no part of religious doctrine, he 
was not only ignorant of the subjects which he taught, but also taught what was false, yet was demented and 
conceited enough to claim that his utterances were those of a divine person.” 
69 De moribus Manichaeorum 19.67-72, 111-114. 
70 De moribus Manichaeorum 19.67, 111. 
71 Conf. VII.2-3, 135-136; De natura boni XLII-XLVIII, 340-348.  As Augustine states in De natura boni XLII, 
340-341: [The Manichees] “tell us that certain souls, parts of the substance of God and sharers in the divine nature, 
as they will have it, went down, not of their own accord but at the command of their Father, to fight against the race 
of darkness, which the Manichees call the evil nature; that they were defeated and taken captive and were 
imprisoned for ever in a horrible sphere of darkness. These souls, of course, did not sin voluntarily. In this way, 
according to their vain profane babbling, God freed part of himself from a great evil, but condemned another part of 
himself which he could not liberate from the enemy, and yet celebrated a triumph as if the enemy had been defeated. 
What wicked and incredible audacity to say or believe or proclaim such things about God!  When they try to defend 
this they fall with closed eyes into worse error. For they say that mixing with the evil nature causes the good divine 
nature to undergo such evils; by itself it cannot and could not have suffered the like. As if an incorruptible nature is 
to be praised because it does itself no harm, and not because nothing else can harm it. Now, if natural darkness 
harmed the divine nature, and the divine nature harmed natural darkness, the fact that they did each other harm 
mutually means that there are two evils.” 
 18
providing Augustine with clear explanations to his queries.72  But although Augustine found 
Faustus to be a man of agreeable personality and an eloquent speaker, he was, in the end, unable 
to answer the questions Augustine put to him.  As Augustine tells it in the Confessiones,  
As soon as it became clear to me that Faustus was quite uninformed about the subjects in 
which I had expected him to be an expert, I began to lose hope that he could lift the veil 
and resolve the problems which perplexed me.73  
 
So devastating was this encounter to Augustine’s confidence in the Manichees, that it seemingly 
precipitated the end of his nine-year association with the group.74   
Having lost faith in Manichaean doctrines, Augustine spent a period of time “treating 
everything as a matter of doubt, as the Academics . . . hovering between one doctrine and 
another,”75 preferring, as he tells us, the theories of some of the philosophers over those of the 
Manichees.  As we shall see in Chapter Three, it was by combining Catholic doctrines with the 
philosophy of the Neoplatonists that Augustine was able to find solutions to the problems that 
troubled him, especially those concerning the nature of God and the nature of evil. 
 
 
                                                 
72 Conf. V.6, 96. 
73 Conf. V.7, 98. 
74 As Augustine tells us in Conf, V.7, 99: “The keen interest which I had had in Manichean doctrine was checked by 
this experience, and my confidence in the other teachers of the sect was further diminished when I saw that Faustus, 
of whom they spoke so much, was obviously unable to settle the numerous problems which troubled me.” 
75 Conf. V.14, 108-109. 
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CHAPTER THREE: NEOPLATONIC INFLUENCES 
 
At the age of 30, Augustine accepted a position in Milan as a teacher of rhetoric.76  It was 
here that Augustine first came into contact with the philosophy of the Neoplatonists.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the doctrines of these philosophers, more specifically the 
doctrines of Plotinus, which had a significant impact on the development of Augustine’s 
metaphysical system and his solution to the problem of evil. 
Bishop Ambrose 
 Although it is impossible to establish with any certainty, it may have been Ambrose, the 
Bishop of Milan, who first introduced Augustine to the philosophy of the Neoplatonists.   
According to some scholars, Ambrose had knowledge of the writings of Plotinus as it is possible 
to trace literal borrowings from Plotinus in the Bishop’s surviving sermons.77  Augustine tells us 
in the Confessiones that he attended the sermons of Ambrose,78 and that it was while listening to 
these sermons that he began to appreciate that the Catholic faith could be defended against the 
arguments and objections of the Manichees and to “unravel the tangle woven by them.”79  As 
recalled from Chapter Two, under the influence of the Manichees, Augustine rejected parts of the 
Old Testament as absurd and the actions of the patriarchs as immoral.80  Ambrose, however, 
interpreted and preached the Scriptures allegorically, and it was through this method that 
Ambrose provided Augustine with a reasonable explanation for his objections to the Scriptures.  
Speaking of the effect Ambrose had on him, Augustine tells us in the Confessiones,   
                                                 
76 Conf. V.13, 107. 
77 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 85. See also, Robert J. O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-
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78 Conf. VI.13, 107. 
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80 Conf. III.7, 62-63.  
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I was glad . . . that at last I had been shown how to interpret the ancient Scriptures of the 
law and the prophets in a different light from that which had previously made them seem 
absurd, when I used to criticize your saints for holding beliefs which they had never 
really held at all. . . . And when he lifted the veil of mystery and disclosed the spiritual 
meaning of texts which, taken literally, appeared to contain the most unlikely doctrines, I 
was not aggrieved by what he said.81  
 
By applying this allegorical method, Augustine began to see that the Scriptures were “not absurd 
at all.”82  In fact, as he tells us, “they can be understood in another sense, quite fairly.”83  Thus 
Augustine discovered a new found respect and faith in Catholicism from which he learned that 
one could be a Christian without ceasing to use one’s reason.84 
Augustine’s Introduction to the Writings of the Neoplatonists 
By his own account, Augustine’s first acknowledged contact with the writings of the 
Neoplatonists was through a number of books given to him that were translated from the original 
Greek into Latin.85  What these books were and who authored them is a subject of debate within 
the secondary literature.86  According to Brown, they may have included treatises by Plotinus 
translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus and possibly at least one work by Porphyry.87  It is 
known through Augustine’s treatises that he was familiar with the writings of Plotinus, for he 
tells us that Plotinus is “praised as having understood Plato more fully than anyone else.”88  But 
while it appears that Augustine had some familiarity with the thought of Plato, including Plato’s 
so-called theory of Forms, most scholars doubt that he ever read or even had access to any of 
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Plato’s writings, other than perhaps a brief section of the Timaeus (27d-47b) translated by 
Cicero.89  The reason is that for most of his life Augustine possessed only a rudimentary 
knowledge of the Greek language.90  While he was instructed in Greek as a boy, from what he 
tells us in the Confessiones, he never liked it and apparently never applied himself to learning the 
language until very late in life.91  Because of this he had to rely on translations, the supply of 
which was extremely “erratic.”92  Augustine seems to have been familiar with the major themes 
of certain Platonic dialogues, such as the Meno, Republic, and Timaeus, as he expresses 
knowledge of them in several of his works, but “there is no evidence that he ever saw the texts of 
these dialogues, either in Greek or Latin.”93    
Regardless of which authors Augustine may have read, it is clear that Neoplatonism had a 
considerable influence on his thought, both as a Christian theologian and as a philosopher.  For 
instance, in the Confessiones Augustine tells us that it was within the writings of the 
Neoplatonists that he found many ideas similar to those in Christianity, as he tells us in Book 
VII: “No one has come closer to us [Christians] than the Platonists.”94  It was through these ideas 
that Augustine was able to break free from Manichaean materialism.  As such, Neoplatonism 
freed Augustine from his former physical conceptions of God 95 and enabled him to conceive of 
God as an immaterial substance.96  It likewise allowed Augustine to realize the goodness of all 
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creation as created by a single good god.97  Moreover, it freed Augustine from the Manichaean 
conception of evil as a physical entity that could impose itself upon the good.98  Following 
Plotinus’s conception of evil in the Enneads, Augustine was able to conceive of evil as privative 
in nature, a privation of the good or privatio boni,99 which in human beings could be attributed to 
the misuse of free will when it turns aside from God.100   
Neoplatonism Defined 
Neoplatonism, according to Eyjolfur Emilsson, is usually defined as the philosophy of 
Plotinus, a third-century Egyptian Greek, and his followers, such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, and 
Proclus.101  Though the philosophical viewpoints of these philosophers were often quite different 
from one another—indeed, as Emilsson states, the Neoplatonism of the third-century was “no 
unified school of thought, but a label put on various Platonically inspired thinkers at different 
places during this period”102—what they all had in common was their claim to be followers, 
interpreters, and improvers of Plato.103  Additionally, they held in common an interest in the 
metaphysical aspects of Plato’s thought, as opposed to his ethical-political interests.  These 
philosophers did not, however, confine themselves solely to the doctrines of Plato.  As pointed 
out by O’Meara, Neoplatonism was more than just an expansion of Plato’s thought, but in fact 
was a synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Pythagorean elements,104 hence, the use of 
the term “Neoplatonism” to describe the views of these philosophers. 
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Platonic Influences on Neoplatonism 
Syntheses aside, some knowledge of Plato’s metaphysical doctrines are essential to an 
understanding of Neoplatonism.  Providing a description of these doctrines, however, is difficult.  
One of the reasons for this is that Plato presented his philosophical views, not in treatises, but in 
the form of dialogues.  How the views discussed in these dialogues are to be understood is a 
point of disagreement in much of the secondary literature.  One of the most famous metaphysical 
doctrines ascribed to Plato is his so-called belief in a realm of abstract objects that he called 
“Forms” or “Ideas.”  Plato’s discussion of these Forms in the dialogues has led some interpreters 
to argue that he had a “theory of Forms,” even though no full account of such a theory is ever 
completely provided by him.  In fact, in at least one dialogue, the Parmenides, Plato raises 
serious objections to the Forms.  These objections, as well as Plato’s inconsistent method of 
discussing the Forms, have led some scholars to argue that Plato never espoused a specific theory 
of Forms.105    
Whether or not Plato actually believed in the existence of the Forms, there is at least 
some consensus as to the general outline of the theory that has been ascribed to him.  Central to 
this doctrine is Plato’s description of a dual nature of reality, in which beyond the sensible world 
of physical objects is posited the existence of another realm that is non-physical, non-spatial, and 
non-temporal.106  The entities that Plato assigns to this realm are the Forms or Ideas.  The objects 
of the changing physical world somehow derive their existence from the Forms, and as such, are 
considered to be mere imitations or imperfect copies of the eternal realities.107  In this way, the 
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Forms are similar to what we would call concepts or universals, except that the Forms do not 
depend on the human mind for their existence.  Rather, it is the mind that depends on the Forms 
for its knowledge, not only of the Forms but of all changing reality as well.108  Because the 
Forms are not a part of the physical world, they are not perceived by the senses, but “by the 
reasoning power of the mind.”109  Likewise, because the physical world is in a state of constant 
change, true scientific knowledge of it is impossible.  Real knowledge, indeed wisdom,110 is only 
to be found in the contemplation of the eternal unchanging Forms, which are the true causes of 
appearances.111 
The word “Form” is the English translation of Plato’s Greek terms eidos and idea, which 
derive from the verb eido, which means “to see.”112  A Form, as such, seems to be something 
akin to a pattern which all things of a particular type or kind relate in order to be of that kind.  In 
this way, Forms are like “paradigms or standards . . . by which the qualities of particular things 
can be judged.”113  Hence, the Form of x denotes what it is to be x, which is the same as what it 
means to be a good x.  To say that a particular human being, for example, is a good human being 
is to say that it possesses all the qualities that a good human being should possess.  The more 
closely a human being exhibits or possesses the qualities of the Form of human being the more 
fully it participates in or fulfils its Form.  In this way, every use of the word “good” in the world 
of opinion, the world of particulars, “points toward the Form of the property for which the 
particular thing is praised.”114  That being said, Plato also talked about Forms of abstract 
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concepts, such as beauty, justice, and equality.  It would be a mistake, therefore, to state that 
Plato’s discussion of Forms is limited to physical objects only.   
 From information provided in the dialogues, Plato also seems to advocate a belief in a 
hierarchy of Forms, with the Form of the Good holding the top position.   For instance, in the 
Republic, the Form of the Good is described as both the best and the most real of all that exists 
[i.e., possessing the most Being],115 although, as Plato states, the “Good is not Being, but 
superior to it in rank and power.”116  Moreover, though the Form of the Good is the cause of 
knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge, such that “what gives truth to the thing 
known and the power to the knower is the Form of the Good.”117 
Below the Good, at the next level of abstraction, are the Forms, which participate in the 
Good.118  In this way the Good is the source of Being of the other Forms,119 and can be viewed as 
a “Form of Form-ness,”120 possessing what is best of all the other Forms.  Below the Forms are 
the sensible objects, or the particulars of the everyday world, which participate in and imitate the 
Forms.121  Sensible particulars are not perfect copies of the Forms which they imitate, however.  
On the contrary, they are imperfect copies, but yet they still exhibit qualities of the Forms in 
which they participate.122   
Plotinus’s Metaphysical System: The One, Intellect, and Soul 
The Neoplatonists developed, interpreted and expanded upon these ascribed doctrines of 
Plato.  The most notable Neoplatonist, Plotinus, wrote a series of treatises which were edited and 
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compiled by Porphyry, Plotinus’s disciple, into a work known as the Enneads, so named because 
the treatises are arranged into six groups of nine.123  Plotinus particularly developed Plato’s 
conception of the Good (which Plotinus also called the One), the hierarchy of the cosmos, and 
the sense of separation between the intelligible and physical realms.  Such an expansion of 
Plato’s metaphysics was, according to T. Kermit Scott, “an elaborate, complex, obscure and 
often paradoxical attempt to provide a picture of reality that would capture th[e] double sense of 
alienation from and identity with the source of all being, while at the same time provide guidance 
for those seeking a ‘return’ to complete unity with the original source;”124 a theme which 
Augustine utilizes in his solution to the problem of moral evil.  
Plotinus’s metaphysical system is comprised of three basic principles or hypostases: the 
One, Intellect, and Soul.  At the top of the Plotinian system is the One, which Plotinus equated 
with the Form of the Good of Plato.125  Three main characteristics of the One are relevant to our 
present study of Augustine.  First, the Plotinian One is “beyond Being.”126  Because it is beyond 
Being, Plotinus tells us that it is not possible to describe or to have knowledge of the One or even 
to talk about it.127  As he states, “it is . . . truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will 
always be speaking of a “something.”128  We can only grasp the One indirectly by deducing what 
it is not, or by speaking about what comes after it.129   
That being said, Plotinus does indeed have quite a lot to say about the One.  First, the 
One is the supreme simplex.  As the supreme simplex it is entirely without multiplicity or 
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composition.130  It is simple because it is perfect, and because it is perfect, it is independent of 
everything, while everything else is dependent on it.131  In addition, because it is “altogether 
simple, it is self-sufficient [and] needs nothing,”132 it lacks nothing, and it is the “measure and 
bound of all things, giving from itself intellect and real Being and soul and life and intellectual 
activity.”133  Furthermore, “it is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power”134 and “must 
be understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but 
because its power cannot be comprehended.”135  
The second important characteristic of the One for this study is that it is that on which 
everything depends for its existence.136  In other words, the One is the cause of both things 
coming into existence and of their being sustained in existence by continuous participation in the 
One.137  As Plotinus explains it, “that which is not the perfect unity, but rather a multiplicity,” 
meaning everything that is not the One, “is kept in Being by this ‘one.’”138  All that exists, then, 
both visible and invisible, is a product of the One’s power, which “overflows to create a 
succession of types of existence.”139  In addition, for Plotinus, in a similar manner in which 
particulars participate in the Forms for Plato, everything that exists participates in “an image of 
the Good . . . for what they share in are images of existence and the One.”140  A consequence of 
the overflow process, however, is that each successive level of existence below the One 
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decreases in reality or Being, as the distance away from the One increases.141  Consequently, all 
levels of existence lower than the perfectly good One are less than perfectly good.  As Plotinus 
puts it, anything that is derived from the One cannot be better or transcend the One, hence, “it 
must be worse, and this means more deficient.”142   
The third characteristic of the One relevant to this study is that it is that “to which 
everything aspires.”143  As Plotinus explains it, the One “must stay still, and all things turn back 
to it, as a circle does to the centre from which all the radii come.”144  This is because all things 
are naturally disposed to direct themselves toward that which is best, which is the Good.145  The 
Good, as the Good, “does not look or aspire to something else, but stay[s] quiet.”146  Rather, the 
Good gives “other things the form of Good, not by its activity directed to them—for they are 
directed to it, their source.”147   In this way, “there is an essential double movement in all being, 
a movement of procession outward or descent, and a movement of return or conversion to the 
higher generative principle.”148    
 But if the One is an unchanging simplex, how can it be the source of everything else that 
exists?  In other words, why is there anything else besides the One, and how does the multiplicity 
arise from it?149  The answer, according to Plotinus, is that everything else is produced from an 
involuntary process of emanation from the One.  As Plotinus puts it, “when anything comes to 
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perfection we see that it produces, and does not endure to remain by itself, but makes something 
else.”150   
 The first emanation out of the One is Intelligence or Intellect.151  It is here that 
multiplicity occurs; as Intelligence is not the One, and therefore not a perfect simple, the realm of 
Intelligence must be more than one.  The realm of Intelligence corresponds roughly to Plato’s 
realm of the Forms or Ideas.  As Plotinus puts it, Intelligence “thinks the real beings [Forms] and 
establishes them in existence.”152  In addition, “all the things . . . which exist as forms in the 
world of sense come from the intelligible world.”153  As the One is beyond Being, Intelligence is 
true Being.  Hence the Forms possess true Being, while the particulars which participate in the 
Forms possess less Being.  The things of sense, as Plotinus explains it, are an “image of the real 
form, and every form which is in something else comes to it from something else and is a 
likeness of that from which it comes.”154  In this way, “the objects of sense are what they are 
called by participation, since their underlying nature receives its shape from elsewhere [the 
Forms].”155  
 Emanating from the realm of Intelligence is the realm of Soul.  The realm of Soul, 
according to Plotinus, has two levels: “a higher level where it acts as a transcendent principle of 
form, order, and intelligent direction and the lower where it operates as an immanent principle of 
life and growth.”156  This lower level, according to Plotinus, is Nature.157   
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Matter and Evil in the Plotinian System 
Emanating out of the lower level of Soul is matter.158  What Plotinus calls matter is a 
substrate that is at the extreme opposite end of the hierarchy from the One and which acts as a 
receptacle for the Forms.  When acted upon by the Forms, this substrate takes on shape and 
qualities that become the many and varied objects of the physical universe.159  All physical 
objects, then, are “composed of matter and form: form in relation to their quality and shape, and 
matter to their substrate, which is undefined because it is not Form.”160  In this way, both 
Intellect and Soul are responsible for all existent physical bodies, Soul being responsible for the 
creation of matter, the substrate of everything that is created, and Intellect being responsible for 
the Forms, which act upon matter to give it the qualities that differentiate everything created out 
of the impression of Form on matter.  Thus, Plotinus describes Intellect as a “craftsman” as the 
Forms bestow shape upon the matter of Soul to create sensible, physical objects.161  
In addition, as matter is at the extreme opposite end of the hierarchy from the One, which 
is beyond Being and equated with the Good, matter as formless non-Being is equated with 
absolute Evil.  In this way, Evil is a sort of Form of non-existence or non-Being.162  As Plotinus 
explains it: 
One can grasp the necessity of evil in this way. Since not only the Good exists, there 
must be the last end to the process of going out past it, or if one prefers to put it like this, 
going down or going away: and this last, after which nothing else can come into being, is 
evil.  Now it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and therefore that 
the Last should exist; and this is matter, which possesses nothing at all of the Good.  And 
in this way too evil is necessary.163  
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Evil, and as such, matter, then, “is a privation of Good and a pure lack of it.”164  Anything that 
comes into contact with matter, as explained by Plotinus, also suffers a lack or a privation of 
Good.165  When Plotinus calls matter evil, however, he does not mean that the “stuff” that things 
are made of is evil.  For Plotinus, everything in the physical universe is good.  It is only when 
something does not have what it should or might have, that matter and evil play a role.166  In 
other words, evil, for Plotinus, is an absence of what should be present in a thing, a sort of failure 
to exist at the fullness of the existent’s potential.  As Plotinus explains it, matter is the same thing 
as the “otherness” that is opposed to the Forms.167  Therefore, though it is non-existent, it has a 
certain sort of existence in this way, and is the same thing as privation, “if privation is opposition 
to the things that exist in rational form.”168   In this way, privation is a “facet of ordinary 
experience glimpsed in all sorts of minor forms of absence, ugliness, decay, and moral and 
physical failings, as well as in death and more extreme cases of moral corruption.”169   
Thus, in a similar manner to Plato, when an object fulfills or fully participates in its 
Form, the object can be said to be fully actualized or fully reaching its potential.  When it falls 
short of its Form, then it falls short of its potential.  As Plotinus puts it, when “we see an ugly 
face in matter, because the formative principle in it has not got the better of the matter so as to 
hide its ugliness, we picture it to ourselves as ugly because it falls short of the form.”170  Hence, 
as Lloyd Gerson explains it: “Matter is what accounts for the diminished reality of the sensible 
world, for all natural things are composed of forms in matter.”171  However, the object or body 
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that lacks something is not the same as evil, for as Plotinus tells us: “Anything which lacks 
something, but has something else, might perhaps hold a middle position between good and evil, 
if its lack and its having more or less balance.”172  Consequently, a thing can be perfect on the 
level of its own nature when it fully participates in its Form.  
Plotinus’s Influence on Augustine 
Equipped with this Neoplatonic conception of reality, Augustine arrived at a new 
understanding of the nature of God and acquired the starting point for his solution to both natural 
and moral evil.  Indeed, as we shall see, Augustine’s solution to the problem of evil is intimately 
linked to this new understanding of God.   
Augustine’s initial conceptions of God were deeply rooted in his nine-year association 
with the Manichees.  As stated in Chapter Two, the Manichees, in order to explain the presence 
of evil in the world, posited the existence of two gods, one good and the other evil.173  These 
gods, according to Manichaean doctrine, are corporal in nature and seemingly mutable, as the 
good and evil gods are engaged in a constant struggle or battle for domination.  When the evil 
god wins, evil occurs; when the good god wins, good occurs.   
 With the aid of the Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphysical conceptions of reality, 
however, Augustine was able to come to a new understanding of God and Being.  First and 
foremost, Augustine accepted the two worlds of Plato: “an intelligible world where truth itself 
resides,” which includes God and the Forms, and the “sensible world that we . . . sense by sight 
and touch,” that is made in the image of the true world.174   
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 Second, Augustine accepted the Platonic view of the simple Good: that “there is a Good, 
which alone is simple, and therefore immutable.”175  This simple Good for Augustine is God.   
From this simple Good, all other goods were created, that is to say, “made, not begotten.”  They 
are made, because if they were begotten, they would be simple and equal to God.  These other 
goods, however, are not simple, and therefore, they are not immutable.176   
Third, Augustine came to the realization that that which is incorruptible is better than that 
which is corruptible, and that that which is incorruptible in any way would be the most perfect 
and the most Good, God.177  Augustine comes to this conclusion by contemplating the Goodness 
of God.  His discussion on the topic can be outlined in the following way: 
1. God is Goodness itself,178 utterly and entirely better than the things which he has 
made.179   
2. To be corrupted is not good.180    
3. Therefore, the substance which is God cannot be corruptible since, if it were, it would 
not be God.181 
 
Thus, the goodness of God implies God’s incorruptibility. 
Fourth, with the assistance of the Platonic and Neoplatonic conception of the One and the 
Forms, Augustine was able to appreciate that that which is immaterial is more real and possesses 
more Being than the particulars of the physical world experienced with the senses.  With this 
new understanding Augustine could now conceive of God as an incorporeal, infinite, immutable, 
and incorruptible being.  In addition, with the help of the Neoplatonic conception of the One, 
Augustine was able to conceive of God as the source of Being for all that exists.182  There is one 
important difference in Augustine’s understanding, however.  While the Neoplatonists conceived 
                                                 
175 De civitate Dei XI.10, 462. 
176 De civitate Dei XI.10, 462. 
177 Conf. VII.4, 137.  
178 Conf. VII.3, 136.  
179 Conf. VII.5, 138. 
180 Conf.  VII.4, 137. 
181 Conf. VII.3, 137. 
182 Conf. VII.20, 154. 
 34
of the One as beyond Being, Augustine conceived of God as possessing full Being.  Augustine 
provides support for his divergence from the Plotinian account by quoting Exodus 3:14 where 
God reveals his name to Moses as “I am the God who is.”183  In other words, according to 
Augustine, God names himself Being itself—ipsum esse—as unqualified existence.   
Using this passage of Exodus as a starting point for his discussion of God’s metaphysical 
nature as it relates to created beings, Augustine tells us in the Confessiones that when he 
considered the things that are of a lower order than God, he saw that they possess neither 
absolute Being, nor are they entirely without Being.  They are real in the sense that they derive 
their Being from God, but unreal in the sense that they are not pure Being.  For, as Augustine 
tells us, “it is only that which remains in Being without change that truly is.”184  
Augustine discusses the same passage from Exodus in De Civitate Dei.  Here he clarifies: 
(1) the distinction between God and created beings; (2) the distinction between created beings 
from one another; and, (3) his use of the word “Being”: 
For God is the Supreme Being – that is, He supremely is; and He is therefore immutable. 
He gave Being to the things that He created from nothing, then, but not a supreme Being 
like His own.  To some He gave being more fully, and to others he gave it in a more 
restricted way; and so he arranged natural entities according to their degrees of Being. 
(Just as the word ‘wisdom’ [sapientia] comes from ‘to be wise’ [sapere], so from ‘to be’ 
[esse] comes ‘Being’ [essentia]: a new word, indeed, which was not used in the Latin 
speech of old, but which has come into use in our own day so that our language should 
not lack a word for what the Greeks call ousia; for this is expressed very exactly by 
essentia.)185 
 
Thus, while God possesses pure Being, everything else that has been created by God possesses 
degrees of Being, depending on where they are ordered in the hierarchy of creation.  
Augustine’s metaphysical hierarchy, however, is more complex than just a distinction 
between the Being of God and the Being of created things.  Augustine’s metaphysical outlook 
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also divides all existing things into three layers of reality.186  At the top of the hierarchy is God; 
in the middle are created spirits, such as angels and human souls; at the bottom are living and 
non-living physical objects, such as bodies, plants, and rocks.  Within the hierarchy, God 
possesses full Being; angels and souls possess less Being than God, and physical objects possess 
less Being than angels and souls.  Additionally, there is an ontological hierarchical order of 
created beings.  Those that have life, according to Augustine, are placed above those that do not 
and those that have the power of generation are placed above those that do not have this capacity.  
Among living things, sentient creatures are placed above those that are not sentient.  As such, 
animals are placed above trees.  Among sentient creatures, those that possess intelligence, human 
beings for example, are placed above those that lack this capacity, such as cattle.  Lastly, among 
the intelligent creatures, immortal creatures, such as angels, are placed above human beings who 
are mortal.187   
Augustine also distinguishes each level in the hierarchy in relation to the “quality of 
immutability.”188  God, existing at the top of the hierarchy of Being, is eternal and immutable.  
Since the Forms, according to Augustine, exist in the mind of God, the Forms are also eternal 
and immutable.189  The level below God consists of all created spirits, including angels and 
human souls.  Angels and souls are immutable in regards to place.  That is, they are not “strictly 
locatable in spatial terms, and hence cannot be said to move about, change, from one place to 
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another.”190  However, because angels and human souls are created beings, they do undergo 
some change: they grow older in time and they experience moral and cognitive changes.  At the 
lowest level of the hierarchy are physical bodies, both living and non-living, which, according to 
Augustine are all mutable and in no way immutable.  As such, they are susceptible to change 
with respect to both place and time.191  
Addressing the question of why God ordered the universe according to a hierarchy and 
did not create everything equal, Augustine tells us: “Because there would not be everything if 
everything were equal.  For there would not be the many kinds of things which make up the 
universe in its hierarchy of created things from the first and second levels of created things right 
down to the last.”192  Thus, a world in which everything is not equal, according to Augustine, is 
more complete than one in which everything is equal.  Even lesser goods, which human beings 
may find distasteful, such as mice or fleas,193 add to the perfection of the whole and the beauty of 
the universe.194   
Finally, one additional difference between Plotinus and Augustine should be mentioned 
regarding the creation of existing beings other than God.  For Plotinus everything that exists was 
created out of an involuntary process of emanation from the One.  For Augustine, however, 
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everything that exists was created by God by a free, generous act of the Divine will.195  Hence, 
God created, “not from any necessity, not because He had need of any benefit, but simply from 
His own goodness: that is, so that it might be good.”196  Augustine’s departure from Plotinus on 
this point is clearly influenced by Christian Scripture, especially the book of Genesis, which 
demands such a deviation from the Plotinian cosmology.     
 Departures from the Plotinian conception of creation aside, it is clear that the philosophy 
of the Neoplatonists, especially that of Plotinus, had a profound impact on Augustine’s 
metaphysical view of reality.  From Plotinus Augustine was able to formulate a new conception 
of God, establish a metaphysical conception of reality based on Christian understandings of 
creation and, as we shall see in Chapter Four, formulate the basis for a solution to the problem of 
evil.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: NATURAL EVIL 
 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold:  First, I will provide an exposition of Augustine's 
privative solution to natural evil.  Although Augustine’s solution has been discussed many times 
in the secondary literature, certain aspects of his account have been somewhat neglected, 
specifically his discussion of evil as a privation of measure, number, and weight.  In this regard I 
will attempt to provide a more detailed account of this facet of Augustine's solution in order to 
show how it is related to his explanation of evil as a privation of goodness and Being.  Second, I 
will show that a single coherent account of Augustine’s privative explanation can be discerned 
from the various ways in which he describes evil, as a privation of goodness, Being, and 
measure, number, and weight.  
Early Conceptions of Evil 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Augustine’s nine-year association with the Manichees 
significantly influenced his early conception of evil.  During this time he tells us that he 
conceived of evil as some kind of an “actual bodily substance”;197 a “shapeless . . . hideous mass 
which might be solid.”198  As a Manichee, Augustine believed that this material mass of evil was 
capable of opposing God, whom he also conceived of as a bodily substance, “extended in space, 
either permeating the world or diffused in infinity beyond it.”199  It was not until Augustine came 
into contact with the philosophy of the Platonists, particularly the idea that reality is divided into 
intelligible and sensible things,200 that he was able to conceive of God as an immaterial 
                                                 
197 Conf. V.10.20, 105.  
198 Conf. V.10.20. See also IV.15.24, 86 and VII.1.1, 133.  
199 Conf. VII.1.1, 133.  
200 By sensible things Augustine means, “those things which can be perceived by the body’s sight and touch” and by 
intelligible things he means, “those which can be understood by the vision of the mind.” De civitate Dei VIII.6, 321.  
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substance:201  “By reading these books of the Platonists I had been prompted to look for [T]ruth 
[God] as something incorporeal, and I caught sight of your invisible nature, as it is known 
through your creatures.”202   This new conception of immaterial substance freed Augustine from 
his earlier conception of evil as a bodily substance as well.  But if evil is not a bodily substance, 
as the Manichees claimed, then what is it?  This is the starting point from which Augustine 
begins his Neoplatonically influenced inquiry into the nature of evil. 
Initial Inquiry into the Nature of Evil 
Augustine begins his inquiry into evil, not as do the Manichees in terms of the “whence” 
of evil, but rather in terms of defining the “what.”  Describing the difference in De Moribus 
Manichaeorum, Augustine tells us that the Manichees “perpetrate the greatest of all absurdities 
[by attempting to seek] out the origin of an unknown thing.”203  But this, according to Augustine, 
is to ask the wrong question.  The correct procedure, as he explains it, is to first discover the 
nature of evil and then to explore its origin.204     
In proceeding to begin with the “what” of evil, Augustine is more specifically asking: 
“What is the metaphysical nature of evil?  Does evil exist as a separate entity and does it have 
Being?  If so, what is the nature of the Being which evil might possess?  Is evil a substance, 
perhaps an immaterial substance?  Or is it something entirely without substance, perhaps the 
opposite of substance, and hence, the negation of Being itself, as thought Plotinus?”  Adding to 
the challenge of responding to these questions is the obligation for Augustine, as a Christian, to 
                                                 
201 Conf. VII.XX.26, 154. 
202 Conf. VII.XX.26, 154. 
203 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.2.2, 66. 
204 Augustine’s preference for inquiring into the “what” before the “whence,” can seemingly be traced to the 
Enneads of Plotinus. In Ennead I.8.1,279, Plotinus writes: "Those who enquire whence evils come, either into 
reality as a whole or to a particular kind of reality, would make an appropriate beginning of their enquiry if they 
proposed the question first, what evil is and what is its nature. In this way one would know whence it came and 
where its seat is and what it affects, and one would be able to decide the general question whether it really exists." 
Using this as a starting point, Plotinus characterizes the “what” of evil in Ennead I.8.4, 289, as the privation of good. 
As Plotinus writes: “[Evil] is altogether without any share in good and is a privation of good and a pure lack of it.”  
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maintain the traditional omnipredicates of God, especially God’s omnipotence and goodness, as 
well as the goodness of creation.205   
Natural Evil Explained 
 Augustine frames his discussion of the nature of evil within the context of the nature of 
God and of creation.  As discussed in Chapter Three, God for Augustine is both Goodness 
itself206 and the highest or the most pure Being.207  As pure Being—indeed, Being itself—God is 
eternal, unchangeable, and immortal.208  As an unchangeable being, God is not susceptible to 
corruption or a degradation of His Being.   
All other things that exist, according to Augustine, were created by God ex nihilo or out 
of nothing.209  By this Augustine does not mean that God created the heaven and the earth and all 
that resides in it out of His own substance.210  If this were the case then everything that existed 
would be equal to God.211  Nor does Augustine mean that there is a substance called “nothing” 
from which God created.  Unlike man, God does not need any material out of which to create; 
God is omnipotent, and as such He is “able to make out of nothing, i.e., out of what has no 
existence at all.”212  So while it is true, according to Augustine, that God created everything out 
of formless matter (an almost nothing that was created on the third day of creation), this formless 
matter was created completely out of nothing by God.213  Furthermore, according to Augustine, 
because everything that exists was created by the one good God, everything created by God is 
                                                 
205 Conf. VII.5.7, 138-139. 
206 Conf. VII.3, 136. 
207 Conf. VII.10, 147. 
208 De natura boni I, 326.   
209 Conf. XII.7, 284. 
210 Conf. XII.7, 284. 
211 Conf. XII.7, 284. 
212 De natura boni I, 326 
213 Conf. XII.8, 285: “For you, O Lord, made the world from formless matter, which you created out of nothing. This 
matter was itself almost nothing, but from it you made all the mighty things which are so wonderful to us.” See also, 
De natura boni I, 326: “Therefore, if the world was made out of some unformed matter, that matter was made out of 
absolutely nothing.”   
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likewise good.214  Because created things were not created from God, however, but rather by God 
out of nothing, they are not equal to God’s goodness, and therefore not wholly and completely 
Good.215  As Augustine puts it in De Natura Boni, all things created by God “are not supremely 
good, but they approximate to the supreme good.”216  But if all things are created good, even 
though not supremely good, then how can we speak of evil?   
The answer, according to Augustine, resides in the nature of beings that are created out of 
nothing.  Based on Augustine’s Neoplatonic understanding of the nature of God, God is the only 
being that is completely good, eternal, and immutable.  Because created beings are not 
supremely and unchangeably good, but only approximate the good, their good is, as Augustine 
puts it in the Enchiridion, capable of diminution and increase.217  Hence, because created Being 
is created out of nothing, it is, by its very nature, susceptible to change.  This is because only that 
which truly is, God, is immutable.218  It is the change from a state of goodness which a created 
being was intended to possess—the degree of goodness with which it was created—to a lesser 
state of goodness that Augustine characterizes as evil.219  As already noted, Augustine’s most 
frequent phrase to describe or define evil is privatio boni—privation of good—but Augustine 
also uses the terms deprivation, corruption, lack, diminution, loss, defect, and negation.220  
                                                 
214 Conf. XII.7, 284-285. 
215 De natura boni I, 326. 
216 De natura boni I, 326. See also De moribus Manichaeorum 2.4, 69. 
217 Augustine, Enchiridion 4.12, in Saint Augustine: Christian Instruction, Admonition and Grace, Christian 
Combat and Enchiridion. trans. Bernard M.  Peebles. ed. Ludwig Schopp, vol. 2 of The Fathers of the Church  
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 1966), 377. 
218 As Augustine puts it in De natura boni I, 326: “The Supreme Good beyond all others is God. It is thereby 
unchangeable good, truly eternal, truly immortal. All other good things derive their origin from him but are not part 
of him. That which is part of him is as he is, but the things he has created are not as he is. Hence if he alone is 
unchangeable, all things that he created are changeable because he made them of nothing. Being omnipotent he is 
able to make out of nothing, i.e., out of what has no existence at all, good things, both great and small, celestial and 
terrestrial, spiritual and corporeal.  Because he is just, he did not make the things he made out of nothing to be equal 
to him whom he begat of himself. Therefore, all good things throughout all the ranks of being, whether great or 
small, can derive their being only from God.” 
219 Conf. III.7, 63. 
220 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 53. 
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So far, then, Augustine’s explanation of the “what” of evil can be outlined as such: 
1. God is supremely and unchangeably good. 
2. God created all things. 
3. Because the things created by God are created by him (out of nothing), as opposed to 
being created from him (from his nature) they are good, but they are not supremely nor 
unchangeably good. 
4. Since created things are not immutably good, the good in created things can be 
diminished and increased.  
5. Evil is the diminution (deprivation, corruption, etc.), of good in a created thing. 
 
In the Confessiones, Augustine further clarifies the relationship of privation to the good, by 
stating: 
It was made clear to me also that even those things which are subject to decay are good.  
If they were of the supreme order of goodness, they could not become corrupt; but neither 
could they become corrupt unless they were in some way good.  For if they were 
supremely good, it would not be possible for them to be corrupted.  On the other hand, if 
they were entirely without good, there would be nothing in them that could become 
corrupt.  For corruption is harmful, but unless it diminished what is good, it could do no 
harm.  The conclusion then must be either that corruption does no harm—which is not 
possible; or that everything which is corrupted is deprived of good—which is beyond 
doubt.  But if they are deprived of all good, they will not exist at all. . . . So we must 
conclude that if things are deprived of all good, they cease altogether to be; and this 
means that as long as they are, they are good.221  
 
Reiterating this point in Book III of the Confessiones, Augustine explains that “evil is nothing 
but the removal [privation] of good until finally no good remains.”222  
From these passages we can conclude that: 
1. Every actual entity is good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted (God), and a lesser 
good if it can be (all created being).  
2. Only those things that are good (but not supremely good) can become corrupt or evil.  
3. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding corruption of the good.  
4. Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. 
5. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being 
deprived.  
6. If, however, the corruption comes to be total, there is no good left, because it is no longer 
an entity at all.  
7. Corruption, then, cannot consume the good without also consuming itself.  
 
                                                 
221 Conf. VII.12.18, 148.   
222 Conf. III.7.12, 63. 
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From this analysis it is clear that evil cannot exist on its own.  Rather, evil can only exist in 
something that has some trace of good in it.  Contrary to the doctrines of the Manichees, then, 
evil for Augustine cannot possess Being, and therefore, it cannot be a substance.  If evil were a 
substance, then it would have to have been created by God and derive its Being from God.  As 
such, it would have to be good, because all things or substances that are made by God are good.  
But evil is not good; if it were it would not be evil.   As Augustine puts it in the Confessiones:   
“. . . whatever is, is good; and evil, the origin of which I was trying to find, is not a substance, 
because if it were a substance, it would be good.”  Consequently, evil has no Being of its own.  
“Corruption” according to Augustine, “does not exist in itself; it exists in some substance which 
it corrupts, for corruption itself is not a substance.”223  As with Plotinus, this does not mean that 
the substance that is corrupted is or becomes evil.  Rather, it is the corruption or privation of the 
goodness of the substance that is called evil.224  As stated so far, then, Augustine’s explanation of 
evil as a privation of good directly refutes the doctrines of the Manichees who stated that evil 
was caused by an evil materialistic god.  For Augustine, however, no such god could exist 
because pure evil cannot exist, as a completely evil god would have no Being or existence.  
 But if this is all that Augustine has to provide as a solution or explanation to the problem 
of evil, such an answer would seem rather mundane and, indeed, not very helpful in our quest to 
understand the “what” of evil.  Two questions arise from Augustine’s explanation: (1) What does 
Augustine mean by his use of the word “good?”; and, (2) How can a privation of good explain 
the “what” of evil?  The key to unlocking the answers to these questions is to comprehend the 
relationship between Being and goodness in Augustine’s metaphysical system.  
 
                                                 
223 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.5.7, 69.  
224 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.5.7, 69. 
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Evil as a Privation of Being  
Central to Augustine’s understanding of natural evil as a privation of the good is the 
equating of Being with Goodness, a view that, although not specifically stated as such, can be 
deduced, from the manner in which Augustine discusses the good and Being in the treatises in 
which he discusses evil.  One of the most concise ways in which Augustine makes the 
connection between the two terms is by saying that whatever exists is good.225  According to this 
view, the highest Good, God, has the most Being or existence.  As Augustine tell us: “there is no 
greater good than God Himself”226 and “God . . . cannot be called anything other than Being 
Itself.”227  A thing has Being, according to Augustine, “when it remains, stands firmly, and is 
always the same. . .”228  God, for Augustine, then, is that being which is the highest Good, that 
possesses the most Being, and that is immutable.  Because God is the highest Being and 
immutable, God is also incorruptible.229  All other beings, as created beings, derive their Being 
from God.230  Hence, as already discussed, every created being has less goodness and less Being, 
than does God.  Created beings, as created beings, are susceptible to change and therefore 
corruptible and susceptible to losing their Being.  “For what undergoes a change,” according to 
Augustine, “does not retain its own Being, and what is subject to change, even though it may not 
actually be changed, can still lose the Being which it had.”231   
                                                 
225 Conf. VII.12, 48. 
226 De moribus Manichaeorum 1.11.18, 18.  
227 De moribus Manichaeorum 1.14.24, 21.  
228 Augustine, De beata vita 2.8, in vol. 1 of Writings of Saint Augustine,  trans. Ludwig Schopp (New York: Cima 
Publishing Company, 1948), 54.   
229 Augustine, De Trinitate V.2.3, in Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, vol. 45 of The Fathers of the 
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231 De Trinitate V.2.3, 177. 
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When Augustine speaks of evil as the privation of the good, then, he is equating goodness 
with Being.  Consequently, any privation of that which is good is also a privation of Being.  Evil, 
therefore, is the privation or the falling away from Being toward non-Being or nothingness.  
Augustine’s clearest statement of this is in De Moribus Manichaeorum, where in discussing the 
“what” of evil he states: 
If . . . you wish to know what corruption [evil] is, notice the state to which it tends to 
bring what it corrupts, for it affects these things in accordance with its own nature.  By 
corruption all things cease to be what they were and are brought to non-permanence, to 
non-being, for being implies permanence.  Hence, what is called the Supreme and Perfect 
Being is so called because it endures in itself.  Anything that changes for the better 
changes, not on account of its permanence, but because it had been altered for the worse, 
that is, it had suffered a loss of essence [Being], a loss which cannot be attributed to the 
being [God] who produced the essence.232   
 
Hence, created beings can both change for the good or for the worse.  When a being changes for 
the worse, it loses both goodness and Being, and, as such, suffers evil.  When a being changes 
for the better, it regains the goodness and the Being which it lost through the process of privation 
or corruption. 
 But what does it mean for a created thing to lose its Being?  Does not something either 
exist or not exist?  And if so, then how can we speak of a being undergoing a loss of Being or 
existence?  What would it mean for a thing to lose its Being and be brought toward non-
existence or nothingness?  
In order to understand what Augustine means by a loss of Being, it is important to have 
an understanding of Augustine’s metaphysics of creation.  As already discussed, God stands at 
the top of the hierarchy of Being as pure Being; God simply is.  Everything else that exists, other 
than God, was created out of unformed matter, which was created from nothing.  It was this 
unformed matter that received the Forms, which exist in the mind of God, which then resulted in 
                                                 
232 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.6.8, 70.  
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the various objects of reality.233  Augustine, like Plato and the Neoplatonists before him, 
conceives of the Forms as eternal and unchanging.234  Everything else that exists, i.e., spiritual 
beings, such as angels and souls, and the various objects of the sensible world, participate in the 
Forms.  It is through this participation in the Forms, according to Augustine, “that whatever is 
exists in whatever manner it does exist.”235  Hence, it is by participating in the Forms, that all 
created beings derive their Being.  In addition, a created thing is created by God with an intended 
level of goodness and Being; “an existence,” as Augustine explains it, “that is perfect for a thing 
of [its] kind.”236  When a being maintains this level of intended goodness and Being, the being 
can be said to be fully participating in or fulfilling its Form, at least to the degree that it is able as 
a created object.  When a being is corrupted, however, it does not fully participate in its Form 
and thereby loses some of the goodness and Being which it was intended to possess.    
Thus, the “what” of evil can be said to be the result of a created being deviating from or not 
fulfilling its Form, to the extent that it is able to do so as a created being.  When this is the case, 
the created being in question possesses less Being than it should and would possess if it were 
fully actualizing or fulfilling its Form.237   Being or existence, then, is not an all or nothing 
condition for Augustine.  Rather, a being can experience degrees of Being or existence: from 
fully participating in its Form, to the loss of so much good and Being that the created being 
borders on non-existence or nothingness.  The path a created object takes from fully participating 
                                                 
233 De vera religione XVIII.36, 242.  See also, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 46, 79-81. 
234 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 46, 79-81. 
235 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 46, 79-81. 
236 De libero arbitrio 3.7.75, 85. 
237 As explained by Etiene Gilson, “Evil is the privation of a good which the subject should possess, a failure to be 
what it should be.”  In Etiene Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: 
Random House, 1960), 144. 
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in its Form to eventual nothingness begins as soon as the object is “born” so to speak, as all 
created temporal objects will eventually cease to be due to their creation out of nothing.238 
So far, then, we have seen that evil for Augustine is a privation or decrease in the intended 
good or Being (“good” and “Being” being correlative terms), that a created being is intended to 
possess.  But what kind of change does a thing have to undergo in order for it to lose the good 
and the Being which it is intended to possess when fully participating in its Form?  Augustine 
discusses wounds and diseases “as deprivations of that good condition proper to it called 
health,”239 but he does not provide many other examples when he discusses evil as a privation of 
good or Being in regards to other kinds of changes a created thing might experience that would 
be categorized as evil.  Just what kind of change in a created being, then, is necessary for evil to 
occur?  Would a qualitative change in any of the accidental properties of an object qualify as an 
evil?  For instance, would a change in a human being from a tan complexion to a pale 
complexion be considered a corruption—a loss of good and Being—and, hence, an evil, 
according to Augustine? 240  Likewise, if a third leg would allow human beings to move more 
quickly from one place to another, would the addition of a third leg be considered an increase in 
the good or Being of a human being?  It would seem that Augustine’s explanation of evil would 
be rather problematic if we take the terms “decrease” or “increase” of the good or Being to mean 
any change in a being’s prior condition.  The answer to the question “What constitutes a change 
of good and Being for Augustine?” is to be found in his discussion of evil as a privation of what 
he calls: “measure, number, and weight.”  
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Measure, Number, and Weight 
The basis for Augustine’s treatment of evil as the privation of measure, number, and 
weight is located once again in Augustine’s understanding of the nature of God and created 
being.  In the Book of Wisdom, a book in the Old Testament Apocrypha, it is read of God that 
He has “disposed all things by measure and number and weight.”241  Augustine reflects and 
comments on this passage in his discussion of creation in De Genesi ad Litteram and asks 
whether measure, number, and weight could have existed before creation such that God could 
have arranged all things in accordance with them, “or whether they too were created.” 242  
Augustine concludes that they did exist before creation, and as such, that they could only have 
existed in God, because nothing existed but God before the creative act.  Because all created 
things receive their Being from God, these principles are imparted by God to all created being, 
both spiritual and corporeal.  But, Augustine adds, even though measure, number, and weight are 
in God, “He is neither measure, nor number, nor weight, nor all three.”243  God transcends the 
creatures which he has created, hence, “He is surely not identified with these three things as we 
know them in creatures, the limit in things that we measure, the number in things that we count, 
the weight in things that we weigh.”244  Rather, according to Augustine, God is “the Measure 
without measure . . . the Number without number . . . and the Weight without weight.”245  In 
other words, God simply is measure, number, and weight, just as God is Being, while at the same 
time imparting these to all that He has created. 
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 It should be noted that Augustine uses a variety of terms to characterize the triadic 
formula, including: “extension, number, and weight” (Contra Faustum Manichaeum);246  
“measure, form, and order” (De Natura Boni and De Civitate Dei);247 “measure, number, and 
order” (De Liberio Arbitrio  and De Genesi Contra Manichaeos);248 “unity, number, and order” 
(De Musica);249 “unity, form, and order” (De Trinitate);250 and finally, “one, species, and order” 
(De Vera Religione).251  Though Augustine does not explain why he changes the terminology,  
what does seem obvious from the various passages in which he discusses the triadic formula is 
that measure, form, and order (or their variants), are ontological principles that apply to all 
created beings, corporeal and incorporeal.252  Explaining the ontological role of the principles in 
De Natura Boni, Augustine tells us that “all things are good, better in proportion as they are 
better measured, formed, and ordered, less good where there is less measure, form, and order”253   
Where they are present in a created being in a high degree there are great goods, where they are 
present in a low degree there are small goods, and where they are absent altogether, there is no 
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goodness.254  For Augustine, then, there would appear to be a direct correlation between the 
ontological principles of measure, form, and order, and good and Being.  Where measure, form, 
and order exist to a greater degree in a being, the being possesses more good and more Being.  
Where they exist to a lower degree, the being possesses less good and Being.   
Measure, Number, and Weight Defined 
As with many terms used by Augustine, a precise definition of the meaning of the words 
“measure,” “number,” and “weight” is nowhere provided.  Perhaps the most concise explanation 
of the triadic formula is given by Augustine in De Genesi ad Litteram where he tells us that 
“measure places a limit on everything, number gives everything form, and weight draws each 
thing to a state of repose and stability.”  Measure, as defined in De Genesi ad Litteram, then, is 
somehow associated with the concept of “limit.”  But such a definition is not very helpful in 
determining how the term is to be understood as a part of Augustine’s overall metaphysical 
system.  The meaning becomes clearer, I suggest, when it is observed, as noted above, that 
Augustine also uses the terms “extension,” “oneness,” “unity,” and, as noted by Bourke, even 
“existence,” to express the same concept.255    
At its most basic level, when something is “measured,” it can be understood as being 
extended in space and/or time.  Hence, the use of Augustine’s correlative term, “extension.”  
Understood in this way, a tree, for instance, has a specific extension that can be measured in 
regards to its width, its length, its breadth, and its duration of existence.  This extension is limited 
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as it has from that same Trinity, has its own form, and is subject to the most perfect order. . . . For every thing, 
substance, essence or nature, or whatever better word there may be, possesses at once these three qualities: it is a 
particular thing [it exists]; it is distinguished from other things by its own proper form; and it does not transgress the 
order of nature.”  
 51
in the sense that it is not infinite, but is confined to specific, finite measurements.  In this way, to 
be measured implies existence, in that only something that can be measured, in some way or 
another, can be said to exist.   
In addition, any created being that is measured or extended in this way possesses the 
quality of oneness, in the sense that it is one thing.  Only God, however, is a perfect one; 
anything else possessing the quality of oneness is also a many in that it is composed of several 
elements or parts.  Thus, anything that is one thing, other than God, is a unity composed of a 
many.  Using the example above, a tree is a composite of many parts, including branches, roots, 
and leaves, among other things.  These parts, however, compose a unity of one tree.  If this 
interpretation is correct, then what Augustine seems to be advocating is that any created being 
that is measured has extension; any created being that has extension is one thing; any created 
being that is one thing is a unity composed of several parts; and, any created being that is a one-
unity has Being simply by the fact that it possesses these qualities.   As Augustine explains it,  
To be . . . is nothing but to be one. And so, to the extent that a thing acquires unity, to that 
extent it has being, for unity brings about the harmony and uniformity by which 
composite things have their measure of Being.  Simple things [i.e., God] exist in 
themselves because they are one, but those which are not simple imitate unity through the 
harmony of their parts, and, in the measure that they achieve this harmony, they exist.256   
 
The meaning of the second term of the Wisdom triad, “number,” is also somewhat 
difficult to grasp due to what appear to be at least two different senses of the use of the word in 
Augustine’s writings: (1) as number itself, and (2) as a substitute for the words “form” and 
“species.”  In regards to the first use, in De Libero Arbitrio, Augustine stresses the fact that 
number is that which gives form to each and everything.257  In this sense, Augustine appears to 
                                                 
256 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.7.10, 72. 
257 As Augustine puts it in De libero arbitrio 2.16.42: "Behold the heaven, the earth, the sea; all that is bright in 
them or above them; all that creep or fly or swim; all have forms because all have number. Take away number and 
they will be nothing. From who have they their being if not from him who has made number? For they exist only in 
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be maintaining the ancient tradition started by the Pythagoreans that numbers are the principles 
of all things.258  The tradition is best articulated by Philolaus (470? – 390? BCE), who in his 
book on the Pythagorean doctrines states, “All things have a number . . . and it is this fact which 
enables them to be known.”259  Aristotle (384-322 BCE), writing of the Pythagoreans in his 
Metaphysics, adds that “since . . . all other things in their whole of nature seemed to be modeled 
on numbers, and numbers seemed to be the first things in the whole of nature, [the Pythagoreans] 
supposed the elements of number to be the elements of all things.”260   
Augustine seems to hold a similar view of numbers as the principles or elements of all 
things, in that numbers are what give an object its unique form.  Thus, as Augustine states, 
“Whatever changeable thing you may look at, you could not grasp it at all, either by the sense of 
the body or by the contemplation of the mind, unless it had some form composed of numbers, 
without which it would sink into nothing.”261  Augustine’s use of the word “number” in this 
sense, then, seems to be related to the concept of extension, in that only something that has shape 
(physical objects) or anything that exists in time (physical objects and spirits) can be measured 
numerically in some way.  
The second sense in which Augustine uses the term “number”—the sense in which he 
seems to use the term in the Wisdom triad—is less difficult to grasp, especially when it is noted, 
                                                                                                                                                             
so far as they have number."  De libero arbitrio, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, trans. John H. S. Burleigh, vol. VI 
of The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 161. 
258 Vincent Foster Hopper, Medieval Number Symbolism: Its Sources, Meaning, and Influence on Thought and 
Expression, no. 152 of Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature (New York: Cooper 
Square Publishers, 1969), 33. According to David L. Mosher, Augustine shared two important convictions with the 
Pythagoreans concerning numbers: “(1)  that numbers (or at least the laws governing them) are objective, timeless, 
and unchangeable features of the universe which are of fundamental importance, not only for the actual structuring 
and ordering of the universe, but also for the understanding of it; and (2) that numbers have special symbolic 
meanings which, for Augustine at least, somehow derive from their privileged metaphysical status.”  See Mosher, 
“Introduction,” De vera religione, 28.  
259 Hopper, 34. 
260 Aristotle, Metaphyiscs A.5, 985b, as quoted in Christopher Butler, Number Symbolism (New York Barnes & 
Noble, 1970), 1. 
261 De libero arbitrio, 2.16.171, Williams, 62. It is unclear in this passage, whether Augustine is using the word 
“form” to mean “shape” or whether he is referring to the Forms of Plato.   
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as seen above, that Augustine sometimes substitutes the words “Form” and “Species” for the 
principle term.  Thus, in discussing the triadic principles in De Genesi ad Litteram, Augustine 
writes: “[God] limits everything, forms everything, and orders everything.”  The passage 
becomes easier to understand when it is remembered that for Augustine the Platonic Forms have 
their origin in the mind of God and that, as Augustine puts it in De Diversis Quaestionibus 
LXXXIII, it is by participation in these [Forms] that whatever is exists in whatever manner it does 
exist.”262   
 Augustine’s use of the word “species” as a correlative term for “Form,” and as such, 
“number,” can be understood in the same manner.  In discussing the Ideas (Forms) of Plato in his 
reply to Question 46 in De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, Augustine states: “in Latin we can 
call the ideas either ‘forms’ (formae), or ‘species,’ (species), which are literal translations of the 
word.”263  Hence, when in De Civitate Dei Augustine writes that “All natures, then, simply 
because they exist . . . have a species of their own,”264 the word “species” should by all accounts 
be read as correlative with the term “Form.”  From these passages it seems clear enough that 
Augustine’s use of the terms “number,” “species” and “form,” in this sense all refer to the Forms 
of Plato. 
 Turning to the third term of the Wisdom triad, “weight,” Augustine again uses the word 
in two different senses in his works: (1) to indicate the place a body assumes that is suitable to its 
own nature, and (2) to indicate the place a created thing has in the order or hierarchy of created 
Being.  In regards to the first sense of the term, Augustine tells us in the Confessiones that a body 
inclines by its own weight towards the place that is most fitting for it.  This place is not 
                                                 
262 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 46, 79-81. 
263 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 46, 79. 
264 De civitate Dei XII.5, 504. 
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necessarily the lowest place, but rather one that is best for a thing of its kind.265  Thus, stones 
come to rest at a place that is best for stones, fire comes to rest at a place that is best for fire, and 
souls come to rest at a place best for souls.266  When things are dislodged from their proper place, 
however, “they are always on the move until they come to rest where they are meant to be.”267 
The second sense of the term becomes more obvious when it is remembered, as shown 
above, that Augustine sometimes substitutes the word “order” for “weight” in the triad.  In this 
sense, Augustine’s use of the term seems to be related to the place a created thing has in the 
order or hierarchy of created being.  This conception of a created hierarchy is a key theme of 
Augustine’s metaphysics and is discussed by him in many of his treatises.  For example, in De 
Genesi Contra Manicheos, Augustine writes that during the act of creation “God arranged the 
forms of all things by ordering and distinguishing them in their places and ranks.”268  As was 
seen in Chapter Three, Augustine divides or orders all existing things into three layers of reality.  
At the top of the hierarchy is God; in the middle are created spirits, such as angels and human 
souls; and, at the bottom are living and non-living physical objects, such as bodies (both human 
and animal), plants, and rocks.  In addition to these three layers, each created being holds a 
specific place in the created order of reality based on the amount of Being given to it by God:  
“To some He gave being more fully, and to others he gave it in a more restricted way; and so he 
arranged natural entities according to their degrees of being.”269  When a thing exists at its 
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intended level of being, it is said to fully be, at least to the degree that it is able as a created 
being.  Any loss in a being’s level of Being, and hence its intended order in the hierarchy, would 
be considered an evil.  Likewise, any turn toward a being’s intended level of order would be a 
turn toward Being, and a restoration of the goodness which it was intended to possess.  In this 
sense Augustine’s use of the terms “weight” and “order” have a teleological significance for an 
individual being as well.  Since each being has an intended level of Being in the hierarchical 
order, a certain degree of perfection and stability is reached when that level is attained.  It is this 
level of perfection to which each being should aspire if it is to fulfill its intended level of order 
and Being in the hierarchy.  Here Augustine seems to maintain a similar view to that of Plotinus, 
in that all things are naturally disposed to direct themselves toward that which is best, which is 
the Good.270  Speaking of the teleological aspect of order as it relates to Being, Augustine tells us 
in De Moribus Manichaeorum that when things change for the better they tend toward Being and 
order, so far as these things can be attained by created beings.271 
Evil as a Privation of Measure, Number, and Weight 
The answer to the question of what constitutes a significant change in a created being in 
order for that change to be considered an evil should now be fairly obvious: only privations of 
measure, form, and order are considered evil for Augustine.272  Changes such as a tan that wears 
off are merely accidental changes that do not affect the measure, number (form), and weight 
(order) of a being.  Hence, such changes would not be considered evil.  Likewise, the lack of a 
third leg in a human being is not a privation, regardless of whether the addition of a third leg 
would improve a human being’s mobility, because having a third leg is not a necessary condition 
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271 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.7.10, 72. 
272 De natura boni XXXVII, 338: “If all natural things would preserve their proper measure, form and order, there 
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for a human being to fulfill its intended potential as created by God.  In fact, a third leg would 
actually interfere with the level of measure, form, and order that a human being was intended to 
possess as a third leg is not how God intended human beings to be formed.   
The Nonexistence of Natural Evil 
Augustine’s investigation into natural evil as a privation of good, Being, and measure, 
form, and order, leads him to conclude that evil does not exist.273  Augustine’s intent here is not 
to claim that evil is an illusion.  The phenomenological and physical experience of evil was all 
too familiar to Augustine in the form of suffering, pain, sickness, and death.  This fact is made 
explicitly clear throughout the Confessiones.  What, then, is the basis for Augustine’s assertion?  
 Augustine provides two answers.  The first answer is located, once again, in the creation 
of beings out of nothing.  As already stated, all created beings are good because they were 
created by the supremely good God.274  But because created beings are not supremely good, their 
good is capable of diminution and increase.275  Hence, though it is not necessary that a creature 
will suffer disease, which is a privation of health, having been created out of nothing makes a 
creature susceptible to doing so.  Why would an all-good God allow such changes to occur?  The 
answer is that God simply could not have made creation any other way.  God was free to create 
or not create, but God was not free to create incorruptible beings.  If God had done so, then 
everything would be immutable and, hence, equal to God, because only God is that which truly 
is.  This susceptibility to be corrupted, however, is not a defect of created beings.  Rather it is an 
inherent feature of the nature of beings created out of nothing.  
Augustine’s second answer is rooted in human perception. Human beings consider parts 
of creation to be evil because they are in conflict or variance with other things, for example, 
                                                 
273 Conf. VII.13, 148-149. 
274 Enchiridion 4.12, 377. 
275 Enchiridion 4.12, 377. 
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death with life, pain with pleasure, and sickness with health.  But according to Augustine, these 
things are in accord with other things of the universe and when they are in accord with these 
things, they are good in themselves.276  Thus, even poison can be considered a good when used 
in the proper manner.277  In order to see this fact, however, one must look at creation in its 
totality, and not just to those things that seem bad to us.  In so doing, one will no longer wish for 
a better world because one will realize that even though the “higher things are better than the 
lower, the sum of all creation is better than the higher things alone.”278  Augustine goes so far as 
to state in De Ordine that the contrast between good and evil is necessary in order to maintain the 
harmony of the universe.  In this way, according to Augustine, the beauty of all things is 
configured from the opposites.279  Therefore, God is not to be blamed with the faults that trouble 
us.  Rather, God is to be praised when we contemplate all the natures which He has made, “for 
just as the opposition of contraries bestows beauty upon language, then, so is the beauty of this 
world enhanced by the opposition of contraries.”280  Thus, according to Augustine, God 
“admonishes us not to condemn things thoughtlessly, but rather to inquire with diligence into the 
utility of things.”281 
Comments on the Coherence of Augustine’s Solution to Natural Evil 
The question that remains to be answered is whether a coherent account can be realized 
from the various ways in which Augustine characterizes evil as a privation of goodness, Being, 
and measure, number, and weight.  For the most part, the answer to this question has been 
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provided in the above explication.  However, it may be worth reviewing some of the components 
of that explication in order to determine whether the various ways in which Augustine discusses 
his privative account provide evidence for a unified metaphysical system.   
As will be recalled from the above examination, Augustine frames his discussion of the 
“what” or nature of evil within the context of the nature of God and creation.  As the most 
perfect and immutable being, God possesses the most good and Being.  All created beings are 
good, but because they were created out of nothing, as opposed to being created out of God’s 
substance, they possess less good and Being, are mutable, and therefore susceptible to change.  
Augustine’s most prominent characterization of natural evil, as described in works such as the 
Confessiones and the Enchiridion, is that evil is a privation of the good that a created being was 
intended to possess, to a lower level.  For instance, sickness and disease are privations of the 
good health that a human being should possess in order to function fully.  Natural evil in this 
way can be said to be parasitic on the good, because only that which is good can become evil and 
suffer a degradation  or corruption of its intended level of goodness.  Since to be good, for 
Augustine, is to exist, good and Being become correlative terms in Augustine’s metaphysical 
vocabulary.  Hence, another way to speak of natural evil is to say that it is a privation or 
corruption of Being, the possible tendency for a being, because it was created out of nothing, to 
fall towards the non-Being or non-existence from which it was created.  In addition, as discussed 
above, created beings are also fashioned by God with an intended degree of measure, number 
(form), and weight (order).  To be measured, for Augustine, is to possess the qualities of 
extension, oneness and unity. To be numbered or formed is to participate in the eternal Forms of 
God’s mind.  And to be weighted or ordered is for a created being to take its proper place in the 
hierarchy of created Being.  In this way, measure, form, and order can be viewed as necessary 
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components of Being, for without them no being could possibly exist.  At its most fundamental 
metaphysical level, then, natural evil—the “what” of evil—is a privation of measure, form, and 
order, which, as already discussed, a being must possess in order to possess Being and goodness.  
In this way, the seemingly inconsistent ways in which Augustine characterizes evil as a privation 
can be seen to be interconnected and part of a unified metaphysical system that describes the 
nature of Being itself; the nature of created Being; and, the relationship between the two.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: MORAL EVIL 
 
The discussion of Augustine’s solution to natural evil in Chapter Four revealed that 
natural evil is described by Augustine as the privation or falling away of a created being, due to 
its creation out of nothing, from its intended level of good, Being, and measure, form, and order 
to a lower level.  The purpose of this chapter is: (1) to reveal Augustine’s solution to the problem 
of moral evil; and (2) to show how Augustine uses his metaphysical explanation of natural evil 
as a foundation or starting point for his explanation of moral evil.  The metaphysical connection 
between Augustine’s solution to natural and moral evil, I argue, provides additional evidence for 
a unified and coherent metaphysical system.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that, for the most part, I will not be discussing 
Augustine’s so-called free will defense of God or his views on original sin, except to the extent 
that each is relevant to my discussion of the metaphysical background or foundation of moral 
evil.  Thus, I will not provide a critique or analysis of Augustine’s free will defense as to whether 
it is logically consistent or whether it is successful as a theodicy for God and the acknowledged 
existence or presence of evil in the world.  In addition, I will not address the issue of whether 
God’s foreknowledge of our sins contradicts our free choice in sinning.  Such issues have been 
discussed to a great extent in the secondary literature and are beyond the intended scope of this 
thesis.   
The Problem of Moral Evil 
The underlying problem of moral evil, in regards to God, is similar to the problem of 
natural evil: If, as Christian doctrine maintains, God is all-good and all-powerful; and, if God is 
the creator of all that exists, including human souls; and, if everything that God created is good; 
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then, how did moral evil, evil that originates from the actions of spiritual beings, enter the world?  
Furthermore, if God is indeed the creator of everything, then is not God somehow ultimately 
responsible for the creation or existence of moral evil?  Augustine states the problem in De 
Libero Arbitrio, as such: 
We believe that everything that exists comes from the one God, and yet we believe that 
God is not the cause of sins.  What is troubling is that if you admit that sins come from 
the souls that God created, and those souls come from God, pretty soon you’ll be tracing 
those sins back to God.282  
 
The answer that Augustine provides for this dilemma is what will be examined here. 
The Metaphysical Components of Moral Evil 
Augustine’s solution to moral evil is intimately linked to at least five metaphysical 
concepts: (1) the nature of God; (2) the nature of created being; (3) a teleological quest of human 
beings for the happy life; (4) a distinction between eternal and temporal beings; and, (5) a 
conception of free will in spiritual beings.  It is within the concept of free will that Augustine 
posits the origin of moral evil, and, as will be seen, all other forms of evil as well.    
As will be recalled from Chapters Three and Four, God, according to Augustine’s 
Neoplatonically derived metaphysics, is: Goodness itself;283 the highest or the most pure 
Being;284 and, pure measure, form, and order.  As pure Being, God is eternal, unchangeable, and 
immortal.285  As an unchangeable or immutable being, God is not susceptible to corruption or a 
degradation of Goodness, Being, or measure, form, and order.  All other beings that exist, both 
physical and spiritual, were created by God out of nothing.  Having been created out of nothing, 
created beings, including spiritual beings, such as angels and human beings, possess a number of 
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characteristics, some of which they share with God and others of which set them inherently 
apart.    
First, because God is good—indeed, goodness itself—everything created by God is 
likewise good, or as Augustine sometimes puts it, “everything good comes from God.”286  From 
this, according to Augustine, “we can understand that human beings too are from God,”287 for as 
Augustine states, “human beings are good things, since they can live rightly if they so will.”288  
Second, because created beings were created by God out of nothing, and not from a part of 
God’s substance, created beings possess less good, and hence, less Being than God.  As such, 
“when God made man,” according to Augustine, “although he made him very good . . . He did 
not make him what he himself is.”289  Third, as supreme, eternal Being, God is immutable.  All 
other beings, however, having been created by God out of nothing, are mutable.  Having been 
created out of nothing, there exists within all created beings the possibility of a tendency to lose 
their goodness and their Being.  In other words, to return to the nothingness from which they 
were created.  It will be remembered from Chapter Four that it is the change from a state of 
good, Being, and measure, form, and order that a created being was intended to possess—the 
degree of good, Being and measure, form, and order that a created being possesses when it is 
fully participating in its Form—to a lesser state of good, Being and measure, form, and order that 
Augustine characterizes as natural evil.290  As will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter, Augustine maintains a similar, although not identical, definition of moral evil, but 
applies it to the concept of the will and its ability to turn toward or away from God, the supreme 
Being.  It is this willful act of turning away from God that Augustine characterizes as moral evil, 
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which thereby produces a privation, corruption, or lessening of Being in the soul in all spiritual 
beings, and in both the soul and the body in human beings.    
The third metaphysical component of Augustine’s account of moral evil is a teleological 
quest for happiness or the happy life, which is intimately linked to the most perfect good, God.  
Augustine discusses the happy life in a number of treatises, including De Libero Arbitrio, De 
Trinitate, and De Beati Vita, but perhaps the most detailed account is provided in De Moribus 
Ecclesiae Catholicae.  Here, in a discussion of how according to reason human beings ought to 
live, Augustine takes as his starting point the position that everyone “wishes to live happily,”291 a 
position that Augustine accepts as being so foundationally universal that he states, “there is no 
human being who would not assent to this statement almost before it is uttered.”292  This happy 
life is to be found in that which is supremely good for man, which Augustine reasons cannot be 
something inferior to human beings, because whoever strives after something inferior becomes 
inferior.293  Instead, according to Augustine, the happy life lies in the “possession of a good than 
which there is no greater.”294  In other words, the happy life for human beings lies in the 
possession of that which is supremely good, which according to Augustine, a person cannot lose 
against one’s will, for no one can be confident in a good that one knows can be taken away.295   
In order to discover this good, Augustine provides an analysis of the composition of a 
human being where he concludes that a human being is composed of both body and soul and that 
the soul is superior to the body because the soul provides the body with life and that which 
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causes the body to be at its best.296  Because the soul is superior to the body, according to 
Augustine, then the soul must rule over the body for the perfection of both.  How does the soul 
achieve perfection for both itself and the body?  By means of virtue, which is the soul’s own 
perfection.  Hence, in regards to morals, when we consider what kind of life one must lead in 
order to attain happiness or the supreme good, it will be, according to Augustine, the kind of life 
that makes that part of human beings that is supremely good—the soul—perfect, through the 
possession of virtue and wisdom.297  As Augustine states, “good morals pertain to that part of us 
which inquires and learns, and these are acts of the soul.”298  When human beings are ruled by a 
virtuous soul, their body is “ruled both better and more worthily and is at its best because of the 
perfection of the soul ruling it rightly.”299   
Augustine concludes from this discussion that the supreme good that perfects the soul 
through the possession of virtue and wisdom is God, such that when we follow after God we live 
well and if we reach God we live not only well but happily.300  All that is best for us, according 
to Augustine, is to be found in God, our supreme good.301  Therefore, “we must not stop at 
anything below Him, nor seek anything beyond, for the first is fraught with danger and the 
second does not exist.”302  On the other hand, if we turn our attention away from God, our souls 
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will not be perfected through the possession of virtue and wisdom and we will be unhappy.  One 
errs, according to Augustine, only in separating oneself from God.303  
For Augustine, then, to strive after and reach God spiritually through reason is happiness 
itself.304  We strive after God by loving Him and we reach God, as Augustine puts it, by 
“touching Him in a wonderfully spiritual way, and being illuminated and pervaded utterly by His 
truth and holiness.”305  Augustine uses the authority of Scripture to support his claim by quoting 
New Testament passages from the Gospel According to Matthew and Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and 
with thy whole mind,”306 for “to those who love God all things work together unto good.”307  On 
the other hand, the farther the mind departs from God “in fondness and greed for things inferior 
to Him [i.e., for the love of sensible things the goodness of which is not supremely good], the 
more [the mind] is filled with foolishness and misery.”308  To act in such a manner is to separate 
oneself from God.  A mind can return to God, the supreme good in which our true happiness 
resides, by (1) confessing that it can fall victim to foolishness and deceit for the love of the 
things of the sensible world,309 and (2) by the grace of God “who calls him to penance and 
forgives his sins.  For who shall deliver the unhappy soul from the body of this death [the soul 
that has turned away from God], except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord?”310 
The distinction that Augustine makes between the love of God who is supremely good 
and the love of sensible things, which, though good, are less good than God, reveals a dichotomy 
in Augustine’s metaphysics between the love of that which is eternal and immutable and the love 
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of that which is temporal and mutable, or as Augustine sometimes puts it, the difference between 
the love of that which is higher, God, and that which is lower, all created sensible things.311  As 
mentioned previously, God alone, for Augustine, is eternally immutable and supremely good.  
Human souls, existing on the second level of Augustine’s three tiered metaphysical hierarchy are 
good, but are not supremely good, while all other physical bodies are less good than human 
souls.  For Augustine, then, if we desire to be happy, we should turn our attention away from 
created sensible things, which are temporal and of a lower order, and instead turn our minds 
toward God, who is eternal and of a higher order on the scale of Being.312  As Augustine explains 
it in De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII, truth is not something that can be gained from the 
bodily senses.  Therefore, it is “in our own greatest interest that we are admonished to turn away 
from this world, which is clearly corporal and sensible, and to turn with all haste to God.313   
Indeed, according to Augustine, to look upon material things with desire and with admiration is 
to be “deceived and led astray by false goods.”314  In regards to these temporal transitory things, 
the temperate human being, according to Augustine, must “love none of them nor look upon 
them as desirable for their own sake, but . . . must utilize them . . . with the moderation of a user 
rather than the passion of a lover.”315   
Such a view is in agreement with Augustine’s acceptance of the Platonic separation 
between the intelligible and physical realms as discussed in Chapter Three.  As will be 
remembered from that discussion, the intelligible realm of the Forms for Plato and the 
Neoplatonists is eternal and unchanging, while the physical realm of corporeal objects is 
temporal and mutable.  Because the physical world is in a state of constant change, true scientific 
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knowledge of it is impossible.  Real knowledge is only to be found in the contemplation of the 
Forms, which are the true causes of appearances.316  The good, therefore, “turn their love away 
from [temporal] things that cannot be possessed without the fear of losing them,”317 because they 
are constantly changing.   
Consequently, according to Augustine, there are two types of things: eternal things, such 
as God and the Forms that exist within God’s mind, and temporal things, such as corporeal 
objects which change over time; and, two types of human beings, those that pursue and love 
eternal things, and those that love and pursue temporal things.318  The choice to “follow and 
embrace” one or the other, as Augustine puts it, “lies with the will.”319  Since the love of the 
supremely eternal being—God—leads to happiness or the happy life, it follows then that it is the 
will that is the vehicle by which spiritual beings, such as angels and human beings, can choose to 
turn toward God and be happy or away from God and be unhappy.  In fact, it is by turning 
toward God that human beings will come to possess wisdom320 and the virtues that constitute an 
upright and honorable life.321  Thus, according to Augustine, “those that will to live upright and 
honorable lives, if they will this more than they will transitory [corporeal] goods, attain such a 
good so easily that they have it by the very act of willing to have it.”322 
 This brings us to the last metaphysical component of Augustine’s explanation for moral 
evil, the will, and more specifically, freedom of the will.  As seen from the discussion in the 
previous section on the love of eternal and temporal things, Augustine posits the existence of a 
will in all spiritual beings created by God.  This will is the vehicle by which human beings turn 
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their attention toward or away from that which is eternal or that which is temporal, thereby 
leading a happy or unhappy, virtuous or unvirtuous, wise or unwise, life.  It is also within the 
movement of the will in which moral evil, and, thus, sin, resides.  As we shall see, Augustine is 
very explicit that it is not God who is responsible for the evils that are caused by spiritual beings.  
Rather, moral evil, indeed all evil, is a result of the misuse of the will.   
The Will Defined 
Augustine acknowledges the existence of his own will in the Confessiones.  Here in 
attempting to determine the cause of evil Augustine states that he knows that he has a will, as 
surely as he knows that there is life in him, because when he chooses to do something or not to 
do it, he is certain that it is his own self, and not some other person, who made the act of will.323 
Not only is Augustine certain that he has a will, but when he chooses to do something that can be 
characterized as either bad or good, he knows that it is his will that is the cause of his bad or 
good action.324  This acknowledgement that the will is freely able to choose between sin and 
right action, happiness or unhappiness, is the starting point for Augustine’s explanation of the 
whence or origin of evil.   
One of the clearest definitions Augustine provides for what he means by the word “will” 
is in De Duabus Animabus Contra.  Here, in attempting to defend the freedom of the will against 
the Manichaean view that human beings sin necessarily as a result of the evil element trapped 
within their bodies, Augustine defines the will as “a movement of mind, no one compelling, 
either for not losing or for obtaining something.”325  Augustine clarifies his definition by stating 
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that when we will something, our mind is moved toward it and we either obtain it or we do not 
obtain it.  If we do obtain it then we will to retain it and if we do not obtain it then we move to 
acquire it.326   
A number of important considerations in regards to moral evil can be discerned from 
Augustine’s definition.  First, the will is an act of the mind, which for Augustine resides in the 
soul.  Second, the act is defined in regards to a movement, either toward obtaining something or 
for not losing something already obtained.  Third, the movement must not be compelled or 
forced but must be free and voluntary in order for the action to be willingly produced.  If the 
movement is compelled, then the movement or action is performed unwillingly.     
The Will, Moral Evil, and Sin 
Having examined the components of moral evil, it is now possible to investigate how 
Augustine uses these components to explain the origin of evil and how that origin is influenced 
by the metaphysics of Augustine’s explanation for natural evil.   
Rejecting the viewpoint of the Manichees that moral evil is a necessity due to the 
merging of both good and evil forces within created beings, Augustine attributes all moral evil to 
the misuse of the freedom of the will with which God endowed rational beings.327  Rational 
creatures, including human beings and angels, sin (commit evil) when, out of a desire for things 
outside themselves, they turn their minds away from God, who is the supreme Good, and turn 
toward created things that are of a lower order in the hierarchy of creation, either themselves or 
some other thing created by God, which though good are not the supreme good.328 
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 It is important to note that it is not the substance to which the will turns that is evil, nor is 
it the substance that is the cause of the evil will.  As a created substance, the substance to which 
the will turns is good because it was created by God who is supremely good.  Neither is it the 
free will itself that is evil.329  Rather, it is the turning of the will away from God and toward a 
thing or things of a lower order that is evil.330  The first rational beings that sinned in such a way 
were the wicked angels, as Augustine calls them.  While the good angels were blessed, because 
they continued to “cleave to Him Who supremely is,”331 the wicked angels became wicked 
because they turned away from the supreme Being and turned to themselves, who have no such 
supreme existence.332  The nature of their sin Augustine tells us, was pride, for “pride is the 
beginning of sin.”333  Thus, “though the angels who became wicked were indeed created good, 
they nonetheless became evil by their own will.”334  Even the devil, according to Augustine, is 
evil only insofar as he has been perverted by his own will.335 
In a similar manner, the first humans that sinned, Adam and Eve, also turned away from 
God and toward themselves.  When human beings were created, their nature was created 
faultless and without sin, according to Augustine.336  They did not remain good, however, for 
they became carnal by loving carnal things.337  As with the wicked angels, their sin was pride, for 
when their souls abandoned God and turned to itself and willed “to enjoy its own power as if 
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without God, [they] swell[ed] up with pride, which is the beginning of every sin.”338  This pride, 
according to Augustine, is a perverse kind of elevation “to forsake the foundation upon which the 
mind should rest [God], and to become and remain, as it were, one’s own foundation.”339   
The Metaphysical Foundation of Moral Evil 
At this point an important question arises regarding the metaphysics of Augustine’s 
explanation: What is the cause of the misuse of the will that makes it turn from what is 
supremely good to something lower on the hierarchy of goodness?  In other words, if the will 
was indeed created good, as were all other things created by God, then how could a good will 
turn bad?   
In response, Augustine explains that an evil will is the efficient cause of evil action, but 
nothing is the efficient cause of an evil will.340  Rather, the cause of the evil will is not efficient, 
but deficient, because the evil will is not an effect of something, but a defect.  For, “to defect 
from that which supremely is, to that which has a less perfect degree of being: this is what it is to 
begin to have an evil will.”341  There is, then, according to Augustine, no essential cause of an 
evil will.  The will itself is the source of evil in rational mutable beings.342  On the other hand, to 
attempt to go further and discern the cause of the defect is like wishing to see darkness or hear 
silence.  Both are known to us not by their appearance, but by their lack of appearance.343  
Darkness and silence are not caused, according to Augustine; they occur simply when light and 
sound are respectively absent.   
                                                 
338 De Genesi contra Manicheos 2.9.12, 108.  
339 De civitate Dei XIV.13, 608. 
340 De civitate Dei XII.6, 505; De libero arbitrio 2.20.54, 69.   
341 De civiate Dei XII.7, 507.  
342 De civiate Dei XII.9, 509. 
343 De civiate Dei XII.7, 508. See also, De libero arbitrio 2.20.54, 69: “. . . every defect comes from nothing, and 
that movement of turning away, which we admit is sin, is a defective movement.”  
 72
Such an answer on the part of Augustine would appear to make the cause of the will’s 
turn toward evil something relegated to the realm of mystery.  But Augustine has more to say on 
the topic and it is within his explanation of the defect of the will that his solution for natural evil 
is used as a foundation for his solution for moral evil.        
As already discussed in Chapter Four, central to Augustine’s solution to natural evil is the 
privation, corruption, or defect of the goodness, Being, and measure, form, and order of a created 
thing, due to its having been created out of nothing.  According to Augustine’s explanation, 
everything that exists is created good.  However, because things are created out of nothing they 
possess less good, less Being, and less measure, form, and order, than does God.  Natural evil, as 
described by Augustine, is the falling away from the intended level of goodness, Being, and 
measure, form, and order, with which a created being was intended to possess, toward a lower 
level.  
In a similar manner, Augustine describes moral evil as a voluntary defection of the will 
from God, Who is goodness itself and Who possess the most Being, to something that possesses 
less good and less Being, either to oneself or to some other created thing.  This defection on the 
part of the will is described by Augustine as a flaw that is “contrary to the nature344 of the thing 
in which the flaw is present.”345  This is not to say that God is responsible for the flaw.  Indeed, 
as has already been pointed out, all natures are good because all natures are created by God Who 
is supremely good.  But, all spiritual natures can deviate or defect from the supreme good 
through an act of self-will, and, thus, become flawed and less good themselves.346  Thus, evil is 
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not a necessary condition for human beings.  Rather, human beings choose to do evil through a 
voluntary misuse of the will.347  In this way God is not responsible for the evil that human beings 
perform when they misuse their will.  God does indeed give humans free will, but it is up to us to 
use it correctly.  When we misuse our will we commit evil.  When we use it correctly, however, 
we become wise and virtuous, attain the happy life, and assume our proper place in the 
hierarchical order of created being.  
 The question that remains to be answered is: What is it about a created nature that makes 
the will susceptible to turning away from the Supreme Good that is God toward something that 
possesses less Being, either oneself or some other corporeal object?  In other words, why does a 
will become corrupted such that it defects from the Supreme Good and what are the effects of the 
defection on the being that turns away?  The basis for Augustine’s answer is derived from the 
answer he provides for how and why a body becomes corrupted in regards to his solution for 
natural evil: an evil will can only exist in a nature that was created out of nothing.348   
Why should a will that exists within a soul made from nothing become defective?  In a 
similar manner to natural evil, a will that is created out of nothing has less good and less Being 
than does God.  Hence, while God is Being itself and immutable, a will made from nothing, 
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though created good,349 has within its nature the potential to become defective.  Thus, according 
to Augustine, though the existence of the will as a nature, which is created good, is due to its 
creation by God, its falling away from its nature is due to its creation out of nothing.  In this way, 
only a nature created out of nothing can be perverted by a defect because it is mutable.350  The 
turning away of a rational being from God results in an ontological loss and downward 
movement from a higher level of Being toward non-Being or nothingness.351  Consequently, 
spiritual beings have a greater measure of good and Being when they cling to God and a less 
perfect degree of good and Being when they turn away.352  In this way, the will “is the source of 
evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and depraved.”353  The 
soul, in which the will resides, however, does not reach a state of nothingness as a result of the 
ontological loss; souls, according to Augustine, are immortal and hence, could never be 
destroyed.354  But they do suffer an ontological loss that brings them closer to nothingness.355   
 Not only does the soul suffer an ontological loss as a result of turning away from God 
toward inferior things, but the body suffers an ontological loss as well.  This occurred first as a 
result of the first sin of Adam and Eve.  Prior to this sin, the first human beings, according to 
Augustine, were “neither troubled by any disturbance of the mind nor pained by any disorder of 
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the body.”356  As such, they “lived according to God in a Paradise both corporeal and 
spiritual.”357  After the first sin, however, both the soul and the body of the first humans suffered 
degradation, such that, while the first humans were previously blessed with eternal life, after the 
Fall they became both dead in spirit and doomed to die in body also.358  As a result of their 
ontological falling away from the Creator, the bodies of human beings were condemned to 
endure pain, to grow old and to suffer death.359    
 In a similar manner, all descendents of Adam also suffer a corporeal ontological loss 
when they commit evil.  This loss is due to the relationship that the soul has to the body.  As the 
soul is that which gives life to the body, any ontological loss in the soul results in a similar 
ontological loss in the body.  On the other hand, when the body perfectly obeys the soul and the 
soul perfectly serves God, the body cannot be affected by evil, “for it can be so affected only by 
sin or its punishment.”360  The consequence of the misuse of the will, then, is not only an 
ontological loss in the soul, but physical disorder as well.  In this way, when God is neglected, 
the soul feels the movements it gives the body and becomes less than it was, and the body, “by 
this offense of its mistress [the soul]” in turn also becomes much less.361   Indeed, asks 
Augustine,   
. . . what is the suffering called physical, if it isn’t the sudden corruption of the health that 
the soul itself, by the bad service it has made of it, has exposed to this corruption?  What 
is the suffering called moral, if it isn’t the deprivation of these changing possessions 
which the soul enjoyed or had hoped to enjoy?362 
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The body, as a result, receives the consequences and punishment of the sin caused by the misuse 
of the free will in the soul.  When the soul turns away from that which is mutable and temporal, 
however, it provides the body an easy life.  Thus the health of the body will be at its best when 
the body has been restored to its former stability because the soul has turned back toward God.363  
It is important to note that creation out of nothing does not necessitate that a good will 
will turn away from God and suffer an ontological loss toward non-Being or nothingness.  Just as 
creation out of nothing in Augustine’s solution to natural evil does not necessitate that a healthy 
body will suffer disease or sickness, although it will eventually suffer death.  But creation out of 
nothing does make both corporeal and spiritual natures susceptible to the possibility of falling 
away from their intended level of being to a lower level.  In regards to moral evil, this 
susceptibility occurs when a human being willingly misuses their will and turns away from God.  
Indeed, an act is not characterized as evil or as a sin, according to Augustine, unless it is 
performed by a voluntary and uncompelled act of the will.  In this way the will must be willing 
to freely turn away from the supreme Being of God toward inferior beings.  Actions that are not 
voluntarily performed as a result of a free will are not sins at all, and hence, are not deserving of 
punishment.364  
Because the misuse of the will is voluntary and not necessary, God, according to 
Augustine, should not be blamed for the evil that human beings commit.  God gave human 
beings free will because they cannot live rightly and achieve the happy life without it.365  “No 
action would be either a sin or a good deed” however, “if it were not performed by the will, and 
so both punishment and reward would be unjust if human beings had no free will.”366  Thus, 
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according to Augustine, it is better for human beings to have free will than to have been created 
without it.  
As stated previously, it is not the substance to which the will turns, whether it be its own 
body or another corporeal object, that is evil.  Having been created by God, all corporeal objects 
are good in themselves.  But the evil that results from the soul’s willful turning away from God 
“cannot exist without the good; for the natures in which evil exists are certainly good, insofar as 
they are natures.”367 As such, in a similar manner to natural evil, the evil that results is not 
eliminated by the removal of the nature or substance in which it has arisen.  Rather, the evil is 
removed “by the healing and correction of the nature which has become vitiated and 
depraved.”368  In the case of the soul, this is accomplished only by the grace of God which heals 
the soul and allows the soul and body to resume its proper intended level of Being, thereby 
achieving a life of wisdom, virtue, and happiness.  
The Will as the Cause of All Natural Evils 
The effect of the first sin by Adam and Eve would appear to be much graver than just an 
ontological loss of the soul and a degradation of the body for these first human sinners and their 
descendents.  In addition, Augustine also seems to advocate, in at least some of his writings, that 
the Fall was also responsible for all other types of natural evil as well, including earthquakes, 
floods, pestilence, crop failures, etc.  This view first appears in De Libero Arbitrio, where 
Augustine states that “a wicked will is the cause of all evils.”369  In this way, Augustine seems to 
hold that the perfect order of the universe was somehow disrupted as a result of the disobedience 
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of Adam and Eve.  The purpose of the disruption, according to Augustine, is punishment for 
sin.370   
If this interpretation is correct, however, it would appear that other parts of creation must 
also suffer as a result of the Fall.  Could Augustine really be suggesting that animals and plants 
must be punished because of the misuse of the will by Adam and Eve?  While Augustine does 
acknowledge that animals suffer pain, since animals are not rational he does not seem to think 
that it is the same type of pain felt by human beings.  Hence, as he states in De Moribus 
Manichaerum in arguing against the Manichaean doctrine that it is wrong to kill and eat animals, 
“in as much as we can perceive by their cries that animals die in pain . . . we make little of this 
since the beast, lacking a rational soul, is not related to us by a common nature.”371  Augustine 
holds a similar view regarding plants.372  Thus the fact that natural disasters in their role as 
punishment for human sin may also kill plants and animals does not seem to be a concern for 
Augustine.  Augustine supports his view by quoting passages of Scripture, reminding us in De 
Moribus Manichaerum,  
that Christ Himself shows that to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of 
plants is the height of superstition, for, judging that there are no common rights between 
us and the beasts and trees, He sent the devils into a herd of swine and with a curse 
withered the tree on which he found no fruit.373 
 
                                                 
370 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus 1.3, in Saint Augustine, On Genesis: Two Books on Genesis 
Against the Manichees and On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, trans. Roland J. Teske, 
vol. 84 of The Fathers of the Church, ed. Thomas P. Halton (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1991), 146. 
371 De moribus Manichaerum 17.59, 105.  
372 De moribus Manichaerum 17.59, 105-106. 
373 De moribus Manichaerum 17.54, 102.  Matthew 8.32; 21.19. 
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From this passage Augustine argues that even Christ did not believe that plants and animals are 
in the same class with us, hence, neither their pain, in the case of animals, nor their death should 
trouble us, because they have no rights.374   
To those who would argue that the suffering of animals is a weakness in creation, 
Augustine reminds us that some creatures are less perfect than others and depending on the place 
they hold in the hierarchy of creation their life is better or worse only in a relative sense.  This 
seemingly is the price that is paid for there being a harmonious whole of a variety of different 
things.  Thus Augustine reminds us in De Civitate Dei, “in the scale of value extending from 
things earthly to things heavenly, from things visible to things invisible, there are some good 
things which are better than others.”375  These things were made unequal in this way, “so that 
they might all exist as distinct individuals.”376 
Comments on the Coherence of Augustine’s Solution to Moral Evil 
The purpose of this chapter was: (1) to provide an explication of Augustine’s solution to 
moral evil; and, (2) to show how Augustine uses his metaphysical explanation for natural evil as 
a foundation for his solution to moral evil.  Having accomplished these two tasks, the question 
                                                 
374 De moribus Manichaerum 17.54, 102.  Matt. 8.32; 21.19. John Passmore notes that the source for Augustine’s 
view on animals may have come from the Stoics who thought that, because animals are devoid of reason, they lack 
rights. See John Passmore, “The Treatment of Animals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (April-June 1975): 
198. 
375 De civitate Dei XI.22, 476-478. See also De civitate Dei XII.4, 502-503. Here Augustine reminds us: “It is . . . 
ridiculous to condemn as vices the faults of beasts and trees and other mutable and moral things which entirely lack 
intellect or sensation or life, even if those faults should corrupt their perishable nature.  For these creatures, at their 
Creator’s will, have received a mode of existence which fits them, as they pass away and give place to others, to 
bring about the lowest form of beauty the beauty of the seasons, which, in its own place, is a harmonious part of this 
world. For, though earthly things were not intended to be coequal with heavenly things, it would still not be fitting 
for the universe to lack these things altogether, even though heavenly things are better.  Accordingly, in those places 
where such things properly belong, some arise as others pass away, the less succumb to the greater, and the things 
that are overcome are transformed into the qualities of those that overcome; and this the appointed order of 
transitory things.  We take no delight in the beauty of this order, because, being ourselves only parts of it, woven 
into it by virtue of our mortal condition, we cannot perceive that those particular aspects which offend us are 
blended aptly and fittingly enough into the whole. This is why, in those circumstances where we are less able to 
perceive it for ourselves, we are most rightly instructed to have faith in the Creator’s providence, lest, in the temerity 
of human rashness, we dare to find any fault with the work of so great a Maker.”  
376 De civitate Dei XI.22, 477. 
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remains as to whether the components of Augustine’s solution to moral evil provide evidence for 
a unified metaphysical system, or whether his solution is independent of the rest of his 
Platonically influenced theology.   
As with natural evil, Augustine frames his discussion of moral evil within the context of 
God and the nature of created beings.  God simply is.  Hence, God possesses the fullness of 
Being, is the most good, and is immutable.  Created beings on the other hand, because they were 
created out of nothing, possess varying degrees of Being less than God and are mutable.  Moral 
evil, and hence sin, is a result of the misuse of the will by rational beings (angels and human 
beings) when they voluntarily turn their attention away from the immutable and most high 
Being, where happiness and Wisdom are to be found, toward something that has less good and 
less Being.  The thing to which the mind turns can be either the body to which the soul is 
attached, another corporeal object outside the body, or anything else, other than God, that fills 
the soul with desire.  Created beings are sustained by God and receive their Being and goodness 
by constantly participating in the Forms that exist in God’s mind.  When the soul clings to God, 
the soul and the body to which the soul is attached participate in the highest level of Being and 
goodness that can be achieved as created substances.  By fully actualizing the Form that is 
appropriate to them, rational Beings achieve virtue, wisdom, and happiness.  On the other hand, 
when the soul turns away from God out of desire for other things, an ontological loss is suffered, 
which in human beings occurs in both the soul and the body.  In explaining why a will created 
good would turn away from God, Augustine states an evil will is the efficient cause of evil 
action, but nothing is the efficient cause of an evil will.  Instead, the cause of the evil will is not 
efficient, but deficient, because the evil will is not an effect of something, but a defect.  The 
cause of this defect, according to Augustine, is the soul’s creation out of nothing, which makes it 
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possible for a rational being to fall away from God toward the nothingness out of which it was 
created.   
As can be seen from this brief review, Augustine’s solution for moral evil is based on 
metaphysical components derived from his solution to natural evil: the nature of God, the nature 
of created being, and the susceptibility of created beings, due to their creation out of nothing, to 
fall away from their intended level of goodness and Being to a lower level.  The primary 
component of Augustine’s solution is a distinction between that which truly is, God, and that 
which depends on that which truly is for its continued existence, all created beings.  Only 
rational created beings can commit moral evil because only rational beings possess a will that 
can voluntarily turn away from the source of their Being.  In turning away from God and 
focusing their attention on things possessing less goodness and Being than God, rational beings 
themselves suffer an ontological loss.  In human beings this loss also results in a loss in the 
Being of the body, due to the symbiotic relationship that the soul has to the body.  In this 
manner, Augustine uses his privative solution to natural evil as a foundation for his solution to 
moral evil.  While moral evil is initiated by the misuse of the will when it turns away from God, 
the effect of the turn is similar to the effect of natural evil on a created substance, a loss of the 
intended level of goodness and Being that a created being was intended to possess.  The 
coherence and consistency between the two solutions provides evidence that Augustine is 
conceiving of the two evils, not as separate solutions for separate problems, but as part of a 
larger metaphysical system.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
The metaphysical investigation of the problem of evil within the philosophically 
influenced theology of Augustine is a complex and often frustrating endeavor.  First, there is the 
sheer number of treatises, dialogues, letters, and sermons written by Augustine, many of which 
are dense and difficult works through which to labor.  Second, as already discussed, many of the 
works which Augustine wrote on the topic were written to address specific practical issues that 
he encountered, rather than an attempt to present a well-organized metaphysical account of his 
solution to evil.  This seemingly disorganized method of expressing his philosophical views 
gives rise to the claim by several commentators that Augustine is an unsystematic thinker. 
It is my supposition, however, as demonstrated in this thesis, that it is possible to identify, 
through a careful reading of the various works in which Augustine discusses the topic of evil, a 
well-developed and coherent metaphysical system which serves as the foundation for his 
philosophically influenced theology.  In this way, Augustine’s discussion of the problem of evil 
can be viewed as a sort of enchiridion or handbook to Augustine’s metaphysics, as almost all of 
his metaphysical beliefs are contained within his explanation of evil.    
That being said, because Augustine does not provide an exposition of his metaphysics all 
in one place, I will concede that he was by no means a systematic writer.  Indeed, if one 
approaches Augustine’s treatises expecting a meticulously constructed system of philosophy 
neatly packaged and thoroughly explained in logical order from one treatise to the next, one will 
be disappointed.  However, if one reads Augustine’s works with an eye for prominent themes 
and a consistency of such themes with one another, a metaphysical system does emerge.  To 
paraphrase Peter Keneally in his discussion of another, more contemporary, philosophically 
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influenced theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, who is also often characterized as having a non-
systematic approach to his philosophy, by calling Augustine a systematic thinker is meant no 
more than that his thought is composed of distinct elements that are to a large degree coherently 
related to one another dialectically, logically, and conceptually.  On the other hand, by stating 
that Augustine is not a systematic writer is meant no more than that he fails to provide adequate 
centrally-organized expositions of many of his foundational concepts.377  In regards to the latter, 
it is true that one has to read almost everything that Augustine has to say about a topic in order to 
extrapolate and identify the metaphysical system Augustine was developing within the context of 
his Christian beliefs, most of which, in the case of evil, is often buried within the details of a 
point he is refuting against the doctrines of the Manichees.  Such was revealed in Chapter Four, 
in which it was demonstrated that Augustine does not make known his entire theory of the 
privation of good, Being, and measure, form, and order all in a single treatise.  While space here 
does not allow for a full discussion of Augustine’s metaphysics, enough can be revealed from his 
discussions of evil in regards to how Augustine characterizes the nature of God, as opposed to 
the nature of created reality, to provide a sense of the basic elements that frame much of 
Augustine’s theological thought.  
Before beginning, however, a few general comments and definitions are in order.  First, 
in order to understand Augustine’s approach to philosophy, one must understand what he means 
when he uses the word “philosophy.”  Augustine provides us with a definition in De Civitate Dei 
where he tells us “if God, by Whom all things were made, is wisdom, as the divine authority and 
truth have shown, then the true philosopher is a lover of God.”378  In this way, “to practice 
                                                 
377 Peter Kennealy, “History, Politics and the Sense of Sin: The Case of Reinhold Niebuhr,” in The Promise of 
History: Essays in Political Philosophy, Series C, ed. Athanasios Moulakis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 136. 
378 De civitate Dei VIII.1, 312.  
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philosophy is to love God.”379  For Augustine, then, all of philosophy begins and ends with love 
for and knowledge of God, who is the source of all Truth and Wisdom.  Since, as Augustine tells 
us, no one is happy who does not enjoy what he loves,380 the goal of the philosopher is to work 
toward a union with God, in whom happiness will be found.  It is for this reason that Augustine 
was attracted to certain aspects of the philosophy of the Platonists, for as he tells us, these 
philosophers, “by knowing God, have discovered where to find the cause by which the universe 
was established, and the light by which truth is to be perceived, and the fount at which we may 
drink of happiness.”381  To drink from this fount of happiness, for Augustine, is to philosophize.   
Second, it would be valuable to define what is meant here by the word “metaphysics,” 
since the word has been used throughout this thesis without offering a formal definition.  By way 
of a minimal definition, the word “metaphysics,” at least as it applies to Augustine’s Platonically 
influenced theology, denotes the process of using reason to come to an understanding of Being.  
Having said that, it should be pointed out that, while the process of understanding Being for 
Augustine is philosophical in nature, by which it is meant that this process of understanding is 
achieved through a form of dialectic, his philosophy cannot be divorced from his theology nor 
his religion.  First and foremost Augustine is a Christian.  Hence, for Augustine, using reason to 
come to an understanding of Being means using reason to come to an understanding of the nature 
of God.  Whatever exposition Augustine provides of his metaphysical system, then, will entail an 
explanation of the relationship between God and the rest of created being.   
In addition, it should be noted that when philosophy and theology come into conflict, 
faith and the authority of Scripture will, for the most part, take precedence over any 
philosophical influence that may have inspired Augustine, such as the Platonism from which he 
                                                 
379 De civitate Dei VIII.8., 324. 
380 De civitate Dei VIII.8., 324. 
381 De civitate Dei VIII.10., 325-326. 
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derived much of his metaphysical viewpoints.  In this way, Augustine beseeches us to “believe in 
order to understand.”382  So while Augustine’s worldview was influenced by Neoplatonic 
philosophy, he believes and thinks metaphysically as a Christian.  Explaining Augustine’s 
Platonically influenced faith, Thomas Aquinas writes in the Summa Theologica, “whenever 
Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything 
consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he 
amended.”383  It is to a discussion of that “amended” Platonically influenced Christian theology 
to which I now turn in order to provide evidence that Augustine was a systematic thinker.    
The Nature of God  
 As mentioned above, to philosophize for Augustine is to know and to love God.  The 
starting point for all of Augustine’s metaphysics rests, therefore, in an understanding of the 
nature of God, which as seen from Chapters Three and Four, is a mixture of Christian and 
Platonic elements.384  In addition, as seen in Chapters Two and Three, Augustine’s understanding 
of God’s nature was an ongoing movement from his early conceptions of God as a physical body 
while a Manichee, to his new Christian understanding of God as an immaterial substance.  
Fundamental to Augustine’s philosophical understanding of God’s nature, as opposed to 
his theological understanding, is a reliance on a conception of Being, which he derived from the 
                                                 
382 Augustine, Sermon XLIII.7.9, in The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, trans. 
Edmund Hill, pt. 3, vol. 2. Sermons on the Old Testament, 20-50, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn: New City Press, 
1990), 242. 
383 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Question 84, Article 5, in Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas: The 
Summa Theologica and The Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), 
390.  
384 This is not to suggest that Augustine’s conception of God’s nature is limited to only Christian and Platonic 
sources. As noted by Lewis Ayres and Michel R. Barnes, Augustine grew up in a culture with a diverse range of 
conceptions of God: “Both polytheist and monotheist traditions persisted in non-Christian (and non-Jewish) religion, 
and both material and immaterial conceptions of God. Traditional Roman civic religions, various philosophical 
traditions, and the newer religions emanating from the eastern half of the empire and beyond, were all viable 
religious options for people of Augustine’s age, despite the increasing power and popularity of Christianity within 
the empire.” It is more than likely, then, that a number of these conceptions filtered into Augustine’s formation of 
God’s nature. See Lewis Ayres and Michel R. Barnes, “God,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. 
Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 384-390.   
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notion of the One from Plotinus, which in turn Plotinus derived from the notion of the Good 
from Plato.  But whereas Plotinus conceives of the One as existing beyond Being, Augustine 
conceives of God as Being itself, as revealed in Augustine’s well-known discussion of Exodus 
3:14; a passage in which God addresses Moses by saying “I am Who am.”385  In other words, 
Augustine conceives of God as pure Being, as “a nature which subsists in itself,”386 and, 
therefore, as possessing the most reality within the ontological structure of the universe.  As pure 
Being, God does not derive Being from any other source.  God simply is.  Contrary to the views 
of the Manichees, then, there can be no existing nature that is contrary to God, for the contrary to 
Being itself would be not-Being, which has no positive existence within Augustine’s 
metaphysical system.387  Thus, there cannot be two divine principles, one all-good and one all-
evil, as claimed by the Manichees.  In addition, in accordance with the views of the Platonists, 
although admittedly in an amended form, Augustine’s conception of God as Pure Being means 
that God is a Perfect Simple, possessing no other components or parts.388  Also in accordance 
with the views of the Platonists, God for Augustine is eternal and immutable, and hence, 
incapable of being changed or corrupted.389  Augustine takes this Platonically influenced 
conception of Being and places it within the Christian conception of God and the created 
universe, as revealed in Augustine’s repeated discussions of the first few Books of Genesis in the 
Confessiones and other treatises.  As such, not only is God conceived of as the Supreme Being, 
but God is also conceived of, in accordance with Scripture, as all good; indeed, as the Good. 390  
                                                 
385 Conf. VII.10, 147.  
386 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.1.1, 65. 
387 De civitate Dei XII.2, 500-501. 
388 De civitate Dei XI.10, 462. Here in discussing the Trinity, Augustine states: “the nature of the Trinity is called 
simple, because it has not anything that it can lose, and because it is not something different from what it has. . .”   
Going further, Augustine states that, as a perfect simple, God cannot be deprived of what God has. 
389 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.1.1, 65. 
390 De civitate Dei XI.24, 481. 
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To be good, then, is to exist and to exist is to be good.391  In this way “Being” and “Good” 
become correlative terms for Augustine.  Of course, Augustine’s conception of God would not 
be wholly Christian unless God is also conceived of as all-powerful392 and all-knowing.393  
While a discussion of the triune aspect of God’s nature is beyond the scope of this thesis, I would 
be neglecting an important aspect of Augustine’s conception of God if I did not mention that 
Augustine’s mature understanding also includes a conception of God as Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.394   
Cosmology: Why Anything Exists Other than God 
Augustine discusses his philosophically inspired cosmology in a number of commentaries 
on Genesis, most notably in: De Genesi Contra Manichaeos, De Genesi Ad Litteram Libri 
Duodecim, and De Genesi Ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber, as well as in the last three books of the 
Confessiones and in Books XI and XII of De Civitate Dei.  Within these works, Augustine 
provides an exegesis as to why anything exists other than God and how God went about the 
creative act.  Contrary to the emanation account of Plotinus, in which created being is a 
necessary process of overflow from the One, for Augustine everything that exists was created by 
a free, generous act of the Divine will.395  Hence, God created not from any necessity, “but 
simply from His own goodness.”396  When God created, he did not create out of his own Being, 
nor did he create from any existing stuff, rather, he created both the spiritual realm (angels and 
                                                 
391 As Augustine states in the Conf. VII.12, 148: “Whatever is, is good.” 
392 In Conf. I.4, 23, Augustine describes God as “mightiest and all-powerful.”  
393 Discussing God’s knowledge in De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 17, 45, Augustine states: 
“Everything past no longer exists, everything future does not yet exist, therefore nothing past and nothing future 
exists. But in God’s sight there is nothing which does not exist. Therefore, in God’s sight, nothing exists as past or 
future, but everything is now.”  
394 See De Trinitate Book VII for Augustine’s description of the triune aspect of God’s nature.  
395 Torchia, Creatio Ex Nihilo, x.  
396 De civitate Dei XI.24, 481. 
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souls) and the visible world (all other things, other than angels and souls), out of nothing.397  The 
objects that exist in the sensible world were created by the impression of the Platonic Forms, 
which exist in God’s mind, on formless matter,398 which Augustine describes as an “almost 
nothing.399  God is the only creator of any nature.400  Created beings cannot create natures out of 
nothing, although they can generate other beings “by the coming together of male and 
female.”401  God created time in creating movement and change in the universe.402  Hence,  
the world was made not in time, but simultaneously with time.  For that which is made in 
time is made both after and before some time: after that which is past, and before that 
which is to come. But there could have been no ‘past’ before the creation, because there 
was then no creature by whose changing movements time could be enacted. 403  
 
Such a view is consistent with Plato’s discussion of time in the Timaeus, where he states that 
time came into existence together with the universe.404   
 
                                                 
397 De Genesi Contra Manichaeos 1.6.10, 57-58; Conf. XII.7, 284-285; De civitate Dei XII.1, 498.  
398 Conf. XII.19, 296: “It is true that anything which is mutable implies for us some formless principle by which it 
receives form or is changed or converted into another form.” 
399 Conf. XII.3-8, 282-286. Explaining the creation of the world from the formless matter, Augustine states: “Then 
on the third day you made the earth and the sea by giving visible form to that formless matter which you had created 
before the first day. You had made a heaven, too, before the first day, because we are told that ‘in the Beginning you 
made heaven and earth.’ But this was the heaven of our heaven. And the earth which you had made before the first 
day was that formless matter. This must be so, because we are told that it was ‘invisible and without form, and 
darkness reigned over the deep.’ It was from this invisible and formless earth, this utter formlessness, this next-to-
nothing, that you were to make all the things of which our changing world consists.” See also De civitate Dei 
XII.26, 536: “For there is one kind of form which is imposed from without upon every item of corporeal matter 
whatsoever.” See also, De Genesi contra Manichaeos I.6.10, 58: “God made all things from nothing. For, though all 
formed things were made from this matter, this matter itself was still made from absolutely nothing.” 
400 De civitate Dei, XII.26, 536. See also Conf. XII.8, 285, where Augustine states: “For you, O Lord made the 
world from formless matter, which you created out of nothing. This matter was itself almost nothing, but from it you 
made all the mighty things which are so wonderful to us.”   
401 De civitate Dei XII.26, 536. 
402 De civitate Dei XI.6, 456. See also, Conf. XII.8, 285-286: “For time is constituted by the changes which take 
place in things as a result of variations and alterations in their form, and the matter of all these things is that invisible 
earth of which we have spoken.” Augustine reiterates the point that time is constituted by change in Conf. XII.11, 
288: “. . .without change of movement there is no time.” 
403 De civitate Dei XI.6, 456; emphasis mine.  
404 Plato, Timaeus, in Plato Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 1129. See also Phaedo 79a, in Plato: Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. 
C.D.C. Reeve, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 1241. As Plato states: “Time, then, came to be 
together with the universe so that just as they were begotten together, they might also be undone together, should 
there ever be an undoing of them.  
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The Nature of Created Being 
Since God, as Goodness and Being itself, created everything else that exists, everything 
else is also good,405 and possesses Being.  Created beings are sustained by God and receive their 
Being and goodness by constantly participating in the Forms that exist in God’s mind.406  
Furthermore, all beings possess the qualities of measure, form and order.407  While God is 
described by Augustine as being the measure of measure, the form of form, and the order of 
order, all created beings are created with an intended level of measure, form, and order.408  As 
will be recalled from Chapter Four, to be measured is to possess the qualities of extension, unity, 
and oneness; to possess form, is to be formed by the eternal Forms of God’s mind; and to possess 
order is for a created being to assume its proper place in the order of the universe, based on the 
type of being that it is.  As such, measure, form, and order are essential elements of existence.  
Because all created beings were created by God out of nothing, however, as opposed to being 
created out of God’s substance, everything else possesses less Being, less good, and less 
measure, form, and order than does God.  In this way, everything created by God is less existent 
than God.409  Furthermore, because everything else that exists was created out of nothing, 
everything else that exists is temporal and hence, susceptible to change.  Thus, created beings 
can experience decreasing and increasing levels of their Being, goodness, and measure, form, 
and order.410  In this way, created beings have within them both the possible tendency to fall 
                                                 
405 As Augustine states in Conf. XII.7, 284-285: “You are good and all that you make must be good.” 
406 See Conf. VII.11, 147. Discussing the relationship between God and created beings, Augustine states: “As for 
me, I know no other content but clinging to God, because unless my being remains in him, it cannot remain in me.”  
407 De Genesi ad litteram IV.3.7, 108. 
408 De Genesi ad litteram IV.3.7, 108. 
409 De civitate Dei XII.2, 500.  See also Conf. VII.11, 147. Here in discussing the relationship between God’s Being 
and the Being of created things, Augustine states: “I considered all the other things that are of a lower order than 
yourself, and I saw that they have not absolute Being in themselves, nor are they entirely without Being. They are 
real in so far as they have their Being from you, but unreal in the sense that they are not what you are. For it is only 
that which remains in Being without change that truly is.” 
410 Enchiridion 4.12, 377. 
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back to the nothingness from which they were created and the ability to regain their intended 
level of Being, goodness, and measure, form, and order.   
The Hierarchy of Being 
In addition to that which is and that which depends on that which truly is, Augustine also 
conceives of reality as a sort of “chain of Being” leading continuously from God, down toward 
almost nothingness.  Within this chain there exists a variety of creatures, from the highest—
meaning, possessing the most Being, goodness, measure, form, and order—to the lowest, 
possessing the least.411  Augustine maintains that a universe structured in this way is a much 
richer and, indeed, better universe than one consisting solely of the higher kinds of created 
beings, such as God and created spirits.412  As Augustine puts it, all created beings “have their 
offices and limits laid down so as to ensure the beauty of the universe.”413   
Beings within the chain are divided into a hierarchical structure of three distinct levels.  
At the top of the hierarchy is God; in the middle are created spirits, such as angels and human 
souls; and, at the bottom are living and non-living physical objects, such as bodies (both human 
and animal), plants, and rocks.  While things do indeed exist on all three levels, some beings 
have more Being than other beings.  As already mentioned, God possesses full Being, angels and 
souls possess less Being than God, while physical objects possess less Being than spirits.414   
In addition to these three layers, each created being holds a specific place in the created 
order of reality based on the amount of Being bestowed upon it by God.415  In this way, those 
beings that have life are placed above those that do not and those that have the power of 
                                                 
411 As Augustine puts it in De civitate Dei XII.2, 500: “To some He [God] gave Being more fully, and to others he 
gave it in a more restricted way; and so he arranged natural entities according to their degrees of being.”   
412 De civitate Dei XII.2, 500; De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, Reply to Question 31, 74; Conf. VII.13, Pine-
Coffin, 149; Conf. VII.15, 150.   
413 De vera religione XL.76, 264-265. 
414 At the lowest level of Being is earth, which Augustine in Conf. XII.19, 296 describes as being closest to formless 
matter: “It is true that of all things which have form none is closer to formlessness than earth and the deep.”  
415 De civitate Dei XI.16, 470. 
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generation are placed above those which lack this capacity.  In addition, sentient beings are 
placed above non-sentient beings, while sentient beings with intelligence are placed above those 
without.  Among the intelligent beings, immortal beings, such as the angels, are placed above 
human beings.   
Immutability and Mutability 
Augustine also distinguishes each level of the hierarchy in relation to the quality of 
immutability.  God, who exists at the top of the hierarchy is eternal and immutable and, hence, 
not subject to change.  Since the Forms, according to Augustine, exist in the mind of God, the 
Forms are also eternal and immutable.  The level below God consists of all created spirits, 
including angels and human souls.  Because angels and souls cannot be said to move or change 
from one place to another, they are immutable in regards to place.  However, angels and spirits 
do undergo some change: they grow older in time and they experience moral and cognitive 
changes.  At the lowest level of the hierarchy are physical bodies, both living and non-living, 
which, according to Augustine are all mutable and in no way immutable.  As such they are 
susceptible to change with respect to both place and time.  
Augustine’s Metaphysical Dualism 
In many ways, Augustine’s ontological conception of the universe can be reduced to a 
dualism, in the sense that everything that exists must be either that which truly is, or a created 
being who’s Being depends on that which truly is.  Thus, every existent has Being to some 
degree: full and perfect Being, if God, and less Being if not God.  Those things that are not that 
which truly is, derive their Being and their continued existence by participating in that which 
truly is.  In this way Augustine accepts the Platonic division of reality into two distinct realms: 
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the intelligible realm and the sensible realm.416  Those natures that exist in the intelligible realm 
possess pure Being while those that exist in the realm of the sensible possess less than pure 
Being.  Those natures that possess pure Being are eternal, while those that possess less than pure 
Being are temporal.  Those natures that possess pure Being are immutable, while those that 
possess less than pure Being are mutable, and hence, subject to corruption and a degradation of 
their Being.   
Evil: The Loss of Being 
 As already pointed out, Augustine’s discussion of evil is divided into an exploration of 
the “what,” an explanation of the metaphysical nature of evil, and the “whence,” an explanation 
of the origin of evil.417  Augustine’s discussion of the “what” leads him to a solution for natural 
evil, while his discussion of the “whence,” leads him to a solution for moral evil.  Augustine’s 
solutions to both natural and moral evil rely on a similar metaphysical foundation.  As discussed 
in Chapter Four, the falling away of a created being from its intended level of Being, good, and 
measure, form, and order, to a lower level, is what Augustine characterizes as natural evil.  In 
this way, evil has no Being of its own; it is simply a lack or a privation of Being, goodness, and 
measure, form, and order in a being created out of nothing.  If a being were to lose all Being, 
good, and measure, form, and order, it would cease to exist.  But as long as a created being 
maintains some degree of these essential elements, it continues to exist.  In this way, only 
something that is good can be evil, for evil is simply a privation of that which is good (i.e, a 
created nature that is good because it exists).    
In a similar manner, moral evil, sin, is described as a loss of the intended level of Being 
that a spiritual substance should possess toward a lower level.  The degradation of Being in the 
                                                 
416 Conf. VII.XX.26, 154; De civitate Dei VIII.6, 321.  
417 De moribus Manichaeorum 2.2.2, 66. 
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spiritual substance occurs when the being voluntarily misuses its will and turns its attention away 
from the most perfect, eternal, and immutable Being, God, where happiness and wisdom are to 
be found, to something mutable, either itself or another created being.  Moral evil in this way is a 
turning away from the most high, eternal, immutable object—God—to an earthly, temporal, 
mutable object; an object that weights the soul down and causes it to become inferior to what it 
was, because, as Augustine states, whoever strives after something inferior (i.e., something 
inferior to God), becomes inferior.418  The ontological downward turn of the soul does not result 
in the annihilation of the soul.  Souls, within Augustine’s philosophically influenced theology, 
are immortal and hence not susceptible to complete annihilation.  But the soul when it commits 
evil due to the misuse of its free will does experience an ontological loss that brings it closer to 
nothingness.  Consequently, as the soul resides in a position between God and corporeal bodies 
in the hierarchy of the universe, so does the soul reside in a position between Supreme Being and 
nothingness.  When the will is used appropriately and the soul clings to God, it achieves the 
greatness of Being that it was intended to possess.  But when the soul misuses its free will and 
turns away from God, it turns toward nothingness.  Thus, the soul resides in a precarious position 
hovering between absolute Being and nothingness, between wisdom and folly, between 
happiness and misery.  The choice to choose one or the other resides in the appropriate use of the 
will.      
Moreover, since in human beings it is the soul that gives life to the body, any loss of 
Being in the soul results in a loss of Being in the body, and, hence, a degradation of the body.  In 
this way the body suffers the punishment of the sin caused by the misuse of freewill.  In addition, 
Augustine suggests, in at least some of his works, that the sin of the first human beings somehow 
                                                 
418 De moribus ecclesiae catholicae 1.3.5, 6. 
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disrupted the order of the universe.419  As a result, natural evils, such as floods and earthquakes 
were unleashed into the world.  The purpose of these natural evils is punishment for sin.  
Closing Thoughts 
Although this brief characterization only begins to scratch the surface of Augustine’s 
more fully developed philosophical beliefs, I believe it is clear from this discussion that he did 
indeed develop a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a 
Platonically influenced Christian context.  While it is true, as stated above, that Augustine did 
not provide a centrally-organized exposition of his metaphysical system all in one place, I 
believe the evidence provided in this thesis does offer proof that he did indeed develop such a 
system and that he returned to it again and again in his treatises, most notably the treatises in 
which he discusses the problem of evil.  This system, above all, is an attempt to understand the 
nature of Being, from the highest and most supreme Being, down to the lowest, and the complex 
relationship between the two.  This is not to suggest that Augustine’s metaphysical system 
answers every possible question regarding the nature of Being.  Augustine admits as much 
himself in regards to several areas of his philosophically influenced theology, most notably his 
ongoing struggle to determine the origin of individual human souls.420  In this, and several other 
areas of his philosophy, Augustine’s thought is an evolving effort to consider several answers to 
problems that troubled him, sometimes never settling on any one solution.  Unanswered 
questions aside, the fact that Augustine was troubled by his inability to come to grips with 
certain issues and harmonize them with the rest of his metaphysical worldview is demonstrative 
of his desire to provide a rational and systematic account of all aspects of the nature of reality.    
 
                                                 
419 De libero arbitrio 3.17.167, Benjamin and Hackstaff, 126; De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus 1.3, 146.  
420 See Retractiones 82, 244.  
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